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 1 
Summary 
In December 2014, Nicaragua officially launched one of the world’s largest 
engineering projects in history, as construction began on a 278 km transoceanic 
canal with an estimated cost of US$50 billion. To implement and finance the 
project, Nicaragua has made an agreement with the foreign investor HKND that has 
received widespread attention and critique. The purpose of this thesis is to examine 
this agreement and explain its content through an historical examination of the 
development of international rules on the protection of foreign property.  
 
The first part of the thesis examines the most important provisions of the 
Nicaraguan canal agreement with respect to the rights and obligations of each party, 
focusing on the provisions of the agreement that affect the regulatory and 
legislative capacity of the state of Nicaragua. It draws the conclusion that the 
agreement is heavily tilted in favor of the foreign investor. The agreement grants 
generous rights to HKND, enables the corporation to steer Nicaraguan legislation 
and protects it against any costs that might result from Nicaraguan legislation and 
regulation.   
 
Drawing on theories that form part of Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL), the second part of the thesis seeks to explain the imbalances in the 
agreement based on a historical examination of the development of international 
rules on the protection of foreign property. By identifying characteristic features of 
the legal protection of foreign investments throughout history, the thesis finds that 
this development has been characterized by fundamental conflicts of interests 
between capital-exporting states and capital-importing states. These conflicts have 
resulted in international legal rules and principles that generally protect the interests 
of foreign investors against the interests of host states.  
 
The conclusion is drawn that historical legal developments have contributed to the 
inequities identified in the Nicaraguan canal agreement by exacerbating already 
existing inequities on a legal level. The thesis finds that the tensions and 
controversies that surround the agreement are fundamentally not new. Rather, the 
agreement’s content and existence manifest the fundamental conflicts of interest 
that have dominated international investment law from its emergence to the present.   
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Sammanfattning 
I december 2014 påbörjade Nicaragua konstruktionen av en 278 km lång kanal 
genom landet. Projektet beräknas kosta 50 miljarder dollar och för dess 
genomförande och finansiering har Nicaragua ingått ett avtal med den utländska 
investeraren HKND, ett avtal som har fått stor uppmärksamhet och som också har 
mötts av mycket kritik. Syftet med denna uppsats är att granska avtalet och förklara 
dess innehåll med hjälp av en genomgång och analys av investeringsrättens 
historiska utveckling.   
 
I uppsatsens första del analyseras de mest centrala delarna av det nicaraguanska 
kanalavtalet med avseende på de rättigheter och skyldigheter som åligger var och 
en av parterna. Denna analys har framförallt koncentrerats till de delar av avtalet 
som påverkar Nicaraguas exekutiva och legislativa befogenheter. Det konstateras 
att avtalet är tydligt balanserat till förmån för den utländska investeraren. Avtalet 
ger HKND vidsträckta ekonomiska rättigheter, tillåter investeraren att styra 
Nicaraguansk lagstiftning och skyddar den samtidigt från alla eventuella kostnader 
som kan uppstå till följd av genomförandet av nya lagar och regler i Nicaragua.  
 
Med utgångspunkt i teoribildningen Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL), söker uppsatsens andra del förklara ojämlikheterna i avtalet utifrån en 
analys av den historiska utvecklingen av den internationella investeringsrätten. 
Genom att identifiera karaktäristiska drag i hur rätten använts för att skydda 
utländska investeringar, konstatera att denna historiska utveckling har präglats av 
fundamentala intressemotsättningar och konflikter mellan kapital-exporterande och 
kapital-importerande stater. Dessa konflikter har resulterat i att internationella 
regler och principer huvudsakligen skyddar utländska investerares intressen 
gentemot kapital-importerande stater.  
 
Slutsatsen dras att denna rättsliga utveckling har bidragit till de ojämlikheterna i det 
nicaraguanska kanalavtalet genom att förstärka redan existerande ojämlikheter på 
en rättslig nivå. Dessutom konstateras att den kritik och debatt som omger avtalet 
inte är unik. Tvärtom så tydliggör avtalet de fundamentala intressemotsättningarna 
som har präglat den internationella investeringsrätten genom historien.   
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"The past isn't dead and buried. In fact, it isn't even past."  
 
– William Faulkner  
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Abbreviations 
 
BIT                         Bilateral Investment Treaty  
 
ERM           Environmental Resource Management  
 
FDI                         Foreign Direct Investments 
 
FSLN                      Sandinista National Liberation Front 
 
HKND                    Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company 
 
IACHR                   Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 
ICSID     International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes  
 
MCA                       Master Concession and Implementation Agreement in respect  
                                 of the Nicaragua Canal and Development Project 
  
NIEO                      New International Economic Order 
 
PSNR                     Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources  
 
TWAIL                  Third World Approaches to International Law 
 
 6 
1 Introduction  
 
1.1 The Nicaraguan Canal Project 
Building a transoceanic canal through Nicaragua has long been a dream of the 
nation, but despite numerous attempts it has never been accomplished. However, 
under current president Daniel Ortega, it appears as if the canal might actually 
become reality. Since 2012, plans have been progressing for a transoceanic canal 
that has been billed as the largest engineering endeavor in history.1 The waterway, 
which will compete with the Panama Canal for traffic between the Pacific and 
Atlantic oceans, is projected to stretch 278 km at an estimated cost of US$50 billion 
and stand completed in 2020 (for a map of the proposed route, see Supplement A).2  
 
President Ortega has presented the canal as Nicaragua’s fastest way to rapid 
economic development, a compelling argument for the second poorest nation in 
Latin America. In return for the concession to the foreign corporation Hong Kong 
Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company (HKND), Nicaragua hopes for 
billions of dollars in investment, tens of thousands of jobs and, eventually, a stable 
source of national income.3 Yet, the project is controversial for many reasons. 
Critics question the need for a second Central American canal, the social and 
environmental effects of the project as well as the foreign investor’s experience 
with large infrastructure projects.4  
 
As the project progresses in its initial phase, protests have grown in strength. 
Opponents claim that the canal concession law and the subsequent agreement with 
HKND violate constitutional guarantees to private property, natural resources, and 
indigenous lands.5 Much of the critique is directed at provisions in the concession 
agreement that require Nicaragua to enact constitutional reform to fulfill the 
agreement, as well as investment protection clauses that appear to heavily 
circumscribe the regulatory and legislative capacity of the Nicaraguan government.6 
This has led many to question why Nicaragua would enter such an agreement in the 
first place. 
 
HKND’s investment in the Nicaraguan canal project is part of a larger trend of 
increasing flows of foreign direct investments (FDI). Such investments are 
characterized by a lasting interest and control by a company in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor, and a 
significant degree of influence on behalf of the investor on the management of that 
enterprise. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
                                                
1 Serrano, 2015 [electronic source]. 
2 McDonald, 2014 [electronic source]. 
3 Watts, 2015 [electronic source]. 
4 Laursen, 2014 [electronic source]. 
5 Rogers, 2013 [electronic source]. 
6 Sweet, 2015 [electronic source]. 
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projects that the total global inflow of FDI will grow by 11 per cent to US$1.4 
trillion in 2015 and that it will grow even further in the following years.7 A majority 
of FDI:s are made in developing countries and investments abroad by multi-
national enterprises now account for a third of those investments.8 Meanwhile, the 
debate over the value of FDI:s is polarized. Proponents of FDI note that it benefits 
both home states (the state from which the investment originate) and host states 
(destination of the investment). Opponents of FDI note that the main benefactors 
often are multi-national corporations that are able to wield great power over smaller 
and weaker economies, and the developed states with which they are identified.9 
 
The agreement between HKND and Nicaragua is a concession agreement, a type of 
investment contract in which a government grants a project sponsor the right to 
develop, own, construct and operate a project under certain terms and conditions.10  
The degree of use of concessions has varied over history. From the mid-1800s to 
the 1930s they were particularly common in both colonial and non-colonial 
settings, but subsequently became less popular.11 Another spike in the granting of 
concessions occurred in the 1990s, as Latin American countries in particular 
granted concessions for the development and operation of different infrastructure 
projects. Generally, modern-day concessions fall in the category of infrastructure 
contracts, just as the Nicaraguan canal agreement.12  
 
While the global value of foreign direct investment grows, the number of 
international investment disputes has increased dramatically.13 Critique has been 
levied at the international investment law regime generally, and investment 
contracts specifically14, for being tilted in the investors’ favor.15 In light of this 
development, the Nicaraguan canal agreement serves as an illustrative example of 
some of the implications of the current investment law regime, for a particular 
investment agreement in a particular host state. Indeed, for an undertaking of such 
magnitude as the Nicaraguan canal project, the details of the canal agreement could 
have consequences that would overshadow almost any other investment agreement.  
 
This thesis examines the Nicaraguan canal agreement and seeks to explain its 
content and existence: what prompted the agreement, what are the agreements most 
important provisions and how do they affect the legislative and regulatory ability of 
the Nicaraguan state? And how does the conflict-torn history of international 
investment law explain the existence and content of the investment agreement?  
 
                                                
7 UNCTAD, 2015, pp. ix-3. 
8 Ibid., pp. 5-10. 
9 Trakman & Ranieri, 2013, p. 5. 
10 Hoffman, 2008, p. 145. 
11 Veeser, 2013, pp. 1136-1138. 
12 Sirtaine, 2005, p. 4. 
13 UNCTAD, 2015, p. 124. 
14 Sheppard & Crocket, 2011, pp. 333-334. 
15 Bishop, 2005, p. 10. 
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1.2 Purpose  
This thesis examines the canal concession agreement between the state of 
Nicaragua and the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company 
(HKND), with respect to the rights and obligations of each party. A particular focus 
of this examination is the provisions of the agreement that affect the regulatory and 
legislative capacity of the state of Nicaragua.  
 
Following the study of the canal concession agreement and its implications, the 
thesis seeks to explain the agreement between Nicaragua and HKND through an 
historical analysis. It examines the origins of international investment law and its 
historical development, concentrating on important developments with respect to 
concession agreements, by identifying characteristic features of the legal protection 
of foreign investments throughout history. This approach is based on the underlying 
theoretical assumption that a presentation that merely examines the current 
investment law regime and its more recent history, would fail to provide a deeper 
understanding of the Nicaraguan canal concession agreement and the current legal 
regime of which it forms apart.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
With the above-described purpose and the delimitations (1.7) in mind, the research 
questions of the thesis are phrased as follows:  
 
− What are the essential rights and obligations of the two parties under the 
canal agreement between HKND and Nicaragua and how do they affect the 
legislative and regulatory power of the state of Nicaragua?   
 
− How can the essential rights and obligations of the two parties under the 
agreement and their effects on the legislative and regulatory ability of the 
Nicaraguan state, be explained by the historical development of rules on 
foreign investment protection in international law?  
 
1.4 Theory  
The theoretical basis of this thesis is connected to a historical focus on how 
historical power-struggles have shaped the content of international investment law 
and concession agreements. The thesis draws on theories that form part of Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). It is a scholarship that grew out 
of discussions among scholars interested in post-colonialism, critical race theory 
and law and development studies at Harvard Law School in the mid 1990. Since its 
establishment, academic work related to TWAIL has expanded into a 
heterogeneous and polycentric field of study.16 Broadly, the scholarship focuses on 
how issues of material distribution and imbalances of power affect the way in 
                                                
16 Gathii, 2011, pp. 26-34. 
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which international legal concepts, norms and doctrines are produced and 
understood.17 It seeks to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of 
international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a hierarchy of 
international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans.18 
Moreover, it challenges what is viewed as a tendency of ‘mainstream scholars’ of 
international law to treat the colonial era as a thing of the past, overcome by the 
process of decolonization. Instead, it connects issues of political economy, the uses 
of violence and the exploitation of natural resources and cultural practices of 
differentiation to the development of international law.19  
 
The theories of two TWAIL scholars in particular, Anthony Anghie and Kate 
Miles, have provided the theoretical frame for this thesis. Anthony Anghie20, author 
of Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2005), examines 
the relationship between imperialism and international law and conceptualizes the 
doctrines, principles and institutions of international law as products of the 
interaction between the colonizer and the colonized. Anghie approaches 
international law as the legal resolution to problems arising within the colonial 
context and argues that traditional principles of international law take on a different 
form when applied to the non-European world.21 Kate Miles22, author of The 
Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the 
Safeguarding of Capital (2013), draws on Anghie’s scholarship but focuses on the 
particulars of international investment law. In her work, Miles examine historical 
conflicts over the content of international investment law with a focus on the power 
relations involved in its emergence.23 This approach is based on theories of Lauren 
Benton24, whose theory connects the creation of international rules and institutions 
to social, political and economic patterns. Benton identifies how contests over 
cultural difference in the law are intertwined with disputes focusing on the control 
of property and its legal definition, asserting that international law emerged 
together with the spread of capitalism through “repetitive assertions of power and 
responses to power”.25 Based on Benton’s theory, Miles view the development of 
international investment law regime as the result of a “dual process of assertion and 
creation”26, focusing on conflicts between capital-exporting and capital-importing 
states and their role in shaping international investment law.27 Adopting Miles 
approach, this thesis analyzes the repetitive and combative mode of interaction that 
has shaped concession agreements and the international investment law regime.28  
                                                
17 Eslava & Pahuja, 2011, pp. 104-105. 
18 Mutua, 2000, p. 31. 
19 Eslava & Pahuja, 2011, p. 105. 
20 Professor at the College Of Law at University of Utah.  
21 Anghie, 2005, pp. 6-11. 
22 Fellow and College lecturer in Law at Gonville and Caius College at Cambridge. 
23 Miles, 2013, p. 7. 
24 Professor of History at New York University.  
25 Benton, 2002, pp. 10-11. 
26 Miles, 2013, p. 7. 
27 Ibid., p. 7. 
28 Miles, 2013, pp. 386-387. 
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1.5 Methodology  
The thesis consists of two main parts. The first part investigates the Nicaraguan 
canal concession agreement and seeks to explain its most important provisions in a 
clear manner. The second part seeks to explain the findings in part one based on an 
analysis of the historical development of international investment law and the use 
of concession agreements, relying on the theory described above. These different 
approaches have required two different methodologies, which are described below.  
1.5.1 The Agreement 
In the first part of the thesis, I describe the canal concession agreement and the two 
Nicaraguan laws preceding it based on the following method. First, I have 
established the relationship between the three different legal acts: law 800, law 840 
and the concession agreement, by examining the provisions that concern their legal 
standing, nationally and internally. Second, I have relied on a contractual legal 
analysis to determine the content of the Nicaraguan canal concession agreement 
itself. In essence, I have examined the agreement’s provisions to assess their legal 
effect and their relationship to other provisions of the agreement, in order to 
achieve a holistic view of its content.  
 
As the concession agreements provides the contractual framework for a gigantic 
infrastructure project and an investment estimated to US$50 billion, the structure 
and terminology of the agreement is inevitably complex. Describing the content of 
such an agreement in a legible manner while staying true to the legal formulations 
has admittedly been a challenge. To the best of my ability, I have sought to 
properly balance these considerations in the presentation of the agreement. 
 
The first part of the thesis only briefly touches upon the concession agreement’s 
standing in international investment law. As the historical analysis of this thesis 
will show, this question has been subject to intense legal and political dispute.29 For 
the purpose of the first part of this thesis, it suffices to conclude that the canal 
agreement is lex specialis with respect to the canal project. To the extent the 
agreement is connected to or makes references to principles of international 
investment law, such aspects are included in the presentation. The historical 
disputes and their relevance for the Nicaraguan concession agreement will be 
elaborated on in the second part of the thesis.  
 
1.5.2 The Historical Development of International 
Investment Law 
The second part of the thesis examines the origins of international investment law 
and its historical development, with particular attention paid to the role and debate 
over concession agreements. This examination is conducted to highlight the nature 
and underlying dynamics of the Nicaraguan canal concession agreement. In writing 
                                                
29 Dickstein, 1988, p. 54. 
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the second part of the thesis, I have turned to a method based on theories that form 
part of TWAIL scholarship.  
 
It should be pointed out that the field of international investment law is 
methodologically challenging. A rule of international law must derive from one of 
the recognized sources, namely (1) treaties and conventions, (2) international 
custom, (3) general principles of law and (4) the ‘subsidiary sources’ of judicial 
decisions and legal teachings. In practice, the two most important sources 
international law are treaties and international custom.30 However, despite many 
attempts at codification, there is not yet a single comprehensive treaty on the law of 
foreign investment that constitutes the core body of international investment law. 
Most of modern international investment law is instead based on investment 
agreements and customary international law, which has grown out of jurisprudence 
of international courts and tribunals, state practice and a number of “soft law” 
instruments adopted with the help of the United Nations (UN).31  
 
Methodologically, I apply Kate Miles theory of the creation of international law to 
explore and explain the development of international investment law. To reiterate, 
this theory views international law as having emerged through a process of 
“repetitive assertions of power and responses to power”.32 Accordingly, I identify 
significant patterns of conflict over the content of international investment law, to 
trace how different states have asserted and enforced their view as representing 
international law and thereby shaped the content of the law.33 It is a method that is 
well suited for the study of international investment law, which throughout history 
has been mostly based on customary international law and has been characterized 
by recurring conflicts between states.34 In its nature, the content of customary law 
must be deduced from states’ actions and pronouncements. Rules of customary 
international law result from the combination of two elements: an established, 
widespread and consistent practice on the part of states and opinio juris, the notion 
that state practice to be relevant must be accompanied by a conviction of adhering 
to an existing rule of law.35  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, it is not clear that a concession agreement 
between a foreign investor and a state should fall within the sphere of international 
law. In fact, under traditional interpretations of international law only states are 
recognized as subjects.36 However, concession agreements have undisputedly 
formed an important part of the conflicts and assertions that characterizes the 
history of international investment law.37 Indeed, the dispute over concession 
agreements’ legal standing is in itself illustrative of the historical dynamics of 
international investment law. Moreover, some of the provisions of the Nicaraguan 
canal agreement connect it to rules or principles belonging to the larger 
international investment law regime. Therefore, an historical analysis of the historic 
                                                
30 Thirlway, 2014, pp. 91-93. 
31 Subedi, 2014, pp. 727-728. 
32 Benton, 2002, p. 11 & Miles, 2013, p. 7. 
33 Miles, 2013, p. 7. 
34 Subedi, 2014, pp. 727-728. 
35 Thirlway, 2014, pp. 102-103.  
36 Anghie, 2005, p. 224. 
37 Lipson, 1985, pp. 4ff. 
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development of international investment law and the use of concession agreements 
is not only justified but also highly relevant to explain the Nicaraguan canal 
agreement. By analyzing the very origins of international investment law and the 
use of concession agreements, rather than taking the starting point in the mid 1900s, 
the thesis is able to accentuate the repetitive dynamics of conflict throughout the 
development of international investment law. In so doing, it is able to provide a 
deeper understanding for the Nicaraguan canal agreement and locate its dynamic as 
part of this ongoing mode of interaction.  
 
1.6 Terminology 
With respect to the area of foreign investment, a few terms are important to 
understand and bear in mind. In a specific foreign investment relationship, a state 
that is the destination of a foreign investment is called the host state, whereas the 
state from which the investor originate is called the home state. For the purpose of 
this thesis these descriptions refer to flows of direct investments, not portfolio 
investments. Generally, states both export and import capital but can be labeled 
either capital-exporting or capital-importing, depending on the net balance of their 
capital flows.38  
 
Traditionally, multi-national corporations have identified with developed states and 
their interests have dominated FDI.39 For much of history, it is therefore accurate to 
describe capital-exporting states as generally being developed countries, and 
capital-importing states as generally being developing countries.40 Consequently, 
these expressions are sometimes used interchangeably in the historical examination 
of this thesis, which helps provide a more stringent presentation. However, it is 
acknowledged that this terminology sometimes might lead to an oversimplification 
of complex events. In addition, it should be pointed out that the FDI landscape has 
been shifting in recent years, as some developing state’s outward flow of FDI has 
increased.41 This trend does not negate the terminology of the historical 
examination of this chapter, yet is significant for the broader context of foreign 
investment. For example, China is projected to become a net exporter of capital in 
2015.42  
 
The thesis makes use of expressions such as developing states and developed states, 
as well as the expression Third World countries to some extent. It is acknowledged 
that there are unsatisfactory aspects to these expressions. Admittedly, they might 
insufficiently describe the complexities involved and might be seen as a 
continuation of a colonial framing of states as civilized or uncivilized.43 However, 
as some sort of categorization of states is necessary the thesis does make use of 
                                                
38 Trakman & Ranieri, 2013, pp. 2-5. 
39 Ibid., 2013, p. 4. 
40 UNCTAD, 2015, iii (the report defines developed states as the members of the OECD plus the 
new European Union countries which are not OECD members. In general, developing states are all 
economies not placed in that group). 
41 Ibid., p. 10. 
42 China Daily USA, 2015 [electronic source]. 
43 Anghie, 2005, p. 3. 
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these terms. Moreover, they appear to be used within much of international legal 
discourse.  
 
1.7 Delimitations 
Following the purpose of this thesis, certain delimitations have been made in its 
examination of the Nicaraguan canal agreement as well as with respect to its 
historical analysis. In its examination of the canal concession agreement, the thesis 
focus on the core rights and obligations of the agreement afforded to the parties, 
with a particular focus on the provisions that affect the regulatory and legislative 
ability of the Nicaraguan state. Accordingly, while the agreement has been 
examined in its entirety, parts of the agreement that does not fall within the scope of 
this thesis have not been included in the presentation.  
 
The analysis of the historical development of international investment law seeks to 
identify broader patterns of interactions between capital-exporting and capital-
importing states. Inevitably, for such an historical analysis to be presented in a clear 
manner, not every specific event of importance to the development of international 
investment law is accounted for. In addition, it must be underscored that the thesis’ 
account of this legal development is not aimed at determining the specific content 
of international customary law on the protection of foreign property at given points 
in time. Considering the conflictual history of this area of international law, such 
determinations would after all be very difficult to successfully accomplish.  
Moreover, the historical analysis’ particular focus on the use of concessions has 
resulted in that other areas of relevance to the development of international 
investment law and the current legal regime are covered in less detail. For example, 
the thesis does only briefly cover the topic of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
Even though they have become paramount to the larger international investment 
law regime of today, they are arguably of lesser importance to the Nicaraguan canal 
agreement. To the extent the BIT regime is relevant to the canal agreement, such 
aspects will be included in chapter 4.  
 
1.8 Previous Research 
A considerable body of scholarship has critically examined the history of 
international law and the relationship between imperialism and international law, 
not least under the TWAIL scholarship as described previously (1.4). Such an 
approach is adopted by Anthony Anghie in Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (2005) and Charles Lipson in Standing Guard: 
Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1985), 
among others. Yet very little of this scholarship has examined the particulars of the 
history of international investment law. The most extensive account of this 
historical development is provided by Kate Miles in her book The Origins of 
International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of 
Capital (2013). The scope of this thesis and the work of Kate Miles do overlap and, 
consequently, Miles’ work has provided an important framework for the historical 
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analysis of this thesis. However, as far as the author is aware, no such historical 
analysis has been provided with a consistent and particular focus on the use of 
concession agreements. Moreover, no other such historical analysis based on 
TWAIL scholarship has been carried out with respect to the Nicaraguan canal 
agreement. To that end, the thesis may provide a substantial contribution.  
 
1.9 Material 
The first part of the thesis is based on both primary and secondary sources. The 
concession agreement between Nicaragua and HKND is executed in both an 
English and a Spanish version that have equal validity and effect.44 However, the 
agreement is also enmeshed with Nicaraguan legislation, especially with two laws, 
law 800 and law 840, that are both written in Spanish. For as comprehensive an 
understanding of these laws as possible, I have relied on a written translation of law 
800 provided by Rolando Ernesto Tellez, an English professor at the Universidad 
Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua and a translation of law 840 by fellow Spanish-
speaking student Josef Hellman.  
 
For an account of the debate and critique surrounding the project I have relied on 
international news sources such as the New Yorker, the Guardian, the Economist 
and the Wall Street Journal. Sources with more detailed knowledge of Nicaragua or 
specific thematic areas, such as the English-language news publication the 
Nicaragua Dispatch and the national resources news site Circle of Blue, have also 
been of use. Moreover, I have examined descriptions and press releases on 
HKND’s website regularly to gain further insight into the project and to sufficiently 
take account of the investor perspective.  
 
The historical examination of this thesis primarily relies on literature that form part 
of TWAIL scholarship, which have been discussed previously in this chapter (p. 8). 
However, it is also based on literature outside of this scholarship, including works 
of writers such as Rudolf Dolzer, Christoph Schreuer, Surya P. Subedi and Ian 
Brownlie. In addition, it should be noted that, despite the amount of controversy 
over BITs and their effects on regulatory autonomy, there has been very little 
attention paid to the sort of stabilization clauses found in the Nicaraguan canal 
agreement.45 Therefore, the options in terms of material for this part of the thesis 
have been limited. Arguably, the most important source for the use and impact of 
stabilization clauses has been the 2009 study on stabilization clauses and human 
rights overseen by the United Nations (UN) and the International Financial 
Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank.46  
1.10 Structure 
This thesis is structured as follows: the first chapter (chapter 1) has provided an 
introduction to the purpose and scope of the thesis and presented its theoretical 
                                                
44 MCA, p. 5196. 
45 Howse, 2011, p. 3. 
46 Shemberg & Aizawa, 2009. 
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basis. The second chapter of this thesis (chapter 2) provides a historical background 
to the canal agreement in Nicaragua and describes the debate surrounding the 
project. Thereafter follows a presentation of the content of the Nicaraguan canal 
concession agreement and the rights and protections it affords the investor vis-à-vis 
the Nicaraguan state (chapter 3). In particular, this examination focuses on the 
provisions of the agreement that limit the regulatory and legislative abilities of the 
Nicaraguan state. The following chapter (chapter 4) analyzes the development of 
international investment law and the use of concessions agreements historically, 
connecting this development to the content of the Nicaraguan canal agreement. 
Finally, the conclusions of the historical analysis are used to achieve a more 
thorough analysis of the content of the Nicaraguan canal concession agreement in 
the thesis’ last chapter (chapter 5). 
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2 Background to the Nicaraguan 
Canal Project 
This chapter presents the background to the Nicaraguan canal project. First, it gives 
a brief account of previous attempts at building a transoceanic Nicaraguan canal 
and a presentation of the context in which the current agreement was made. 
Thereafter, it summarizes the critique and debate that has surrounded the 
agreement, both within Nicaragua and internationally.  
2.1 Dreams of a Nicaraguan Canal  
Dreams of a Nicaraguan transoceanic canal are centuries old and have been held by 
foreigners and Nicaraguans alike. International businessmen, engineers and 
explorers have considered a canal an option to facilitate maritime world trade and, 
similarly, Nicaraguan leaders have investigated possibilities of a canal to boost the 
nation’s economy. In the early 1800s, the Federal Republic of Central America, of 
which Nicaragua was then a part, reached out to the US Congress for support in 
building a canal, but the Americans eventually rejected the plans. Investigations 
were made anew during the Californian Gold Rush in the mid 19th century, as the 
American banker Ozro Childs laid out plans for a canal, yet construction never 
began. Shortly after Child’s plan, the American business magnate Cornelius 
Vanderbilt sought to build according to a similar plan, but the project fell through 
shortly after its initiation as a civil war broke out.47 Additional attempts were made 
in the early 1900s, as the U.S. gained rights to build a Nicaraguan Canal. However, 
the United States instead decided to take control of an attempt at construction of a 
transoceanic canal in Panama – the Panama Canal. Attempts at the construction of a 
transoceanic Nicaraguan canal have also been made fairly recently. Under former 
president Enrique Bolaños (2002-2007), a proposed canal project worth US$25 
billion was suggested. However the project received plenty of critique and 
insufficient foreign aid and was ultimately not ratified by the national assembly. 48 
 
Nicaragua remains the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere after 
Haiti. During the past century, the country has suffered from a 43-year dictatorship, 
civil war and natural disasters. According to the latest World Bank statistics, 42,5 
% of the Nicaraguan population live in poverty.49 Even though Nicaragua’s 
economy grew by more than 4 % in 2014, income distribution is uneven and the 
average Nicaraguan earns less than US$2,000 per year.50 Over the years, 
Nicaraguan opinion has been divided over whether a transoceanic canal is a 
disastrous ambition or a grand design from which the country will reap huge 
reward. Proponents claim that the canal project is the fastest way to pull Nicaragua 
out of poverty, raise employment rates and attract investments. Opponents question 
the economic rationale behind such a project, and fear that a canal will have 
                                                
47 Arizona State University, 2015 [electronic source]. 
48 Runde, 2015 [electronic source]. 
49 The World Bank Group, 2015 [electronic source]. 
50 Central Intelligence Agency, 2015 [electronic source]. 
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disastrous environmental and social effects.51 Nevertheless, 71 percent of 
Nicaraguans living far from the canal route support it, according to the latest poll 
conducted in December 2014. Yet support dropped to 42 percent among those 
living along the canal’s path.52 
 
The current attempt at a transoceanic Nicaraguan canal appears to have both the 
political and financial backing necessary to make it through to completion. 
President Daniel Ortega, the elected president of Nicaragua, has made the canal a 
centerpiece of his legacy.53 Formerly a leader of the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) that fought against the ruling Somoza family, he has been a key 
player in the Nicaraguan political landscape since at least the 1970s. Ortega 
previously served as president of Nicaragua between 1984 and 1990 and was 
reelected 2007 thanks to strong support among Nicaragua’s poor.54 During the last 
election, Ortega’s party FSLN won 62 seats in the Nicaraguan National Assembly, 
obtaining a majority that enables it to undertake constitutional reforms 
singlehandedly.55  
 
Nicaragua has granted the canal concession to Hong Kong Nicaragua Development 
Group (HKND), a private infrastructure development firm based in Hong Kong led 
by Chinese businessman Wang Jing. According to the company website, HKND 
has ”extensive experience in construction management and infrastructure 
development”56, yet analysts point to HKND’s lack of experience from major 
infrastructure projects.57 Moreover, little is known of exactly how HKND will raise 
the estimated US$50 billion required for the project. Wang, who rapidly rose to 
wealth in the Chinese telecom industry during the 21st century, has yet to reveal any 
of co-investors in the project and China has denied involvement in the project.58 
Such uncertainties, together with social, environmental and legal concerns have 
resulted in widespread attention for the project.  
 
2.2 Criticism and Concerns About the Project 
The Nicaraguan canal project has received ample attention and critique. It has been 
particularly criticized for being rushed through without proper consultation or 
transparency. Critics point to the fact that the Nicaraguan parliament only had two 
days to debate the canal concession proposal, despite that it is by far the biggest 
project in the country’s history.59 Broadly, three lines of criticism can be discerned: 
critique aimed at the constitutionality of the agreement, critique concerning the 
project’s environmental effects and critique levied at the economic rationale behind 
the project.  
                                                
51 Hanson, 2015 [electronic source]. 
52 Erlich, 2015 [electronic source]. 
53 Runde, 2015 [electronic source]. 
54 Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2015 [electronic source]. 
55 European Union Election Observation Mission, 2011, pp. 35-36. 
56 HKND (1), 2015 [electronic source]. 
57 McDonald, 2014 [electronic source]. 
58 Runde, 2015 [electronic source]. 
59 Watts, 2015 [electronic source]. 
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2.2.1 Constitutional Aspects 
Law 840, which approved Nicaragua’s concession agreement with HKND, was met 
by a flurry of constitutional challenges filed by the opposition, civil society and 
indigenous groups. The challenges alleged violations of constitutional guarantees to 
natural resources, private property and indigenous lands.60 However, the 
Nicaraguan Supreme court dismissed all suits against the canal concession law in 
late 2013.61 According to Supreme Court President Alba Luz Ramos, “Law 840 is 
not unconstitutional. It remains exactly as it was approved in the National 
Assembly.”62 Nevertheless, claims against the agreement of constitutional 
violations remain. Opponents say they fear the concession agreement will leave 
Nicaragua’s national sovereignty “in pieces”63 and many Nicaraguans worry over 
the effects of the investor’s right to expropriate land, believing it will lead to unfair 
land confiscations and evictions.64 Property owners in the proposed canal zone also 
complained last year that they were intimidated, sometimes with violence, by 
surveyors accompanied by army and police.65  
 
Because of the size of the project, HKND’s concession may have enormous social 
impact. According to some estimates, as many as 30,000 Nicaraguan property 
owners might be affected by expropriation carried out in the name of the project.66 
Moreover, in a constitutional complaint to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) canal opponents warned that roughly 120,000 people 
would be directly uprooted by the canal project.67 The concession affects areas and 
populations of the Nicaraguan Atlantic coast region that enjoy specific 
constitutional protection. The region is home to many distinct ethno-racial groups, 
including the indigenous Miskito, Mayangna and Rama groups as well as two 
groups of African descent: the Creole and Garifuna.68A number of these groups, 
together with territorial government authorities in the Atlantic autonomous region, 
filed one of the first suits to the Supreme Court, arguing that the concession law 
violated provisions of both Nicaragua’s Constitution and the coast’s Autonomy 
Statute.69 Under the constitution, the peoples of the Atlantic coast area have the 
right to preserve and develop their distinct cultures, languages and religions; to 
have ownership of their communal lands; to use and benefit from the region’s 
natural resources and to enjoy regional autonomy. These constitutional rights are 
the result of a long-lasting struggle. Since their incorporation into Nicaragua in 
1894, the groups of the Atlantic coast fought for the self-government rights they 
were promised until they were given such rights under the new Nicaraguan 
Constitution, ratified in 1986 by the Sandinista government.70 The Inter-American 
                                                
60 Serrano, 2015 [electronic source]. 
61 Sweet, 2015 [electronic source]. 
62 López Baltodano, 2014 [electronic source]. 
63 Rogers, 2013 [electronic source]. 
64 Watts, 2015 [electronic source]. 
65 Freedom House, 2015 [electronic source]. 
66 Anderson Lee, 2015 [electronic source]. 
67 Serrano, 2015 [electronic source]. 
68 Hooker, 2009, pp. 2-3. 
69 Hegg Ortega, 2013 [electronic source]. 
70 Hooker, 2009, p. 3. 
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Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) called the implementation of the canal 
project, without consultation of indigenous groups ”troubling”.71 
 
2.2.2 Environmental Impact 
The potential environmental impact of the canal project and its effects on wildlife 
and ecosystems has also led to much criticism. Scientists are particularly alarmed 
over the project’s effects on Lake Cocibolca, the largest freshwater lake in Central 
America on which more than 200,000 Nicaraguans rely for their drinking water. To 
allow the passage of the massive container ships, too large to fit through the 
Panama Canal, nearly the entire path through the lake would have to be dredged to 
remove 1,2 billion tons of sediment, which inevitably would effect water quality 
and aquatic life.72   
 
To meet such concerns, HKND has commissioned the firm Environmental 
Resources Management (ERM) to perform an Environmental Impact Study (ESI) of 
the canal project. Yet environmental experts and scientists have heavily criticized 
the assessments made by ERM. An independent panel of scientist and experts in 
Florida, who were allowed to review drafts of the study in March 2015, described 
the study as rife with scientific flaws. Moreover, it deemed the period allowed for 
the assessment by HKND, 1,5 years, insufficient considering the magnitude of the 
project.73 The panel concluded that the studies by ERM used insufficient data with 
regards to water quality, geology, erosion and biodiversity. One of the main 
concerns of the panel was how the removal of 1,2 billion tons of sediment from 
Lake Cocibolca might threaten water quality and aquatic life. The analysis of ERM 
on this point was labeled “incomplete and implausible”.74 Further, the panel said 
the study provided limited data on how the physical barrier created by the canal 
would inhibit animal movement and gene flow, possibly resulting in inbreeding and 
decreased biodiversity affecting threatened or endangered species. Overall, the 
panel argued, much more extensive sampling was needed over several seasons to 
provide a sufficient assessment of the environmental impact of the canal.75 
 
In response to the panel’s review statement, ERM generally agreed with the 
weaknesses in the work that the panel illustrated, but said that some analysis had 
been reworked. The company admitted that the time frame for the assessment was 
short and recommended itself that several additional studies be completed to 
confirm key assumptions “before a final decision is made by the government of 
Nicaragua”.76 It also partly agreed with the panel regarding the need for a more 
robust evaluation of the project, and said “further consideration of alternatives is 
warranted in several areas.”77  
 
                                                
71 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2014 [electronic source]. 
72 Serrano, 2015 [electronic source]. 
73 Nicaragua Canal Environmental Impact Assessment Review Panel, 2015, p. 1. 
74 Ibid., p. 3. 
75 Ibid., p. 9. 
76 Environmental Resource Management (1), 2015, p. 2. 
77 Environmental Resource Management (1), 2015, p. 2. 
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On may 31st, ERM completed its report to HKND which handed it over to the 
Nicaraguan government.78 In its report, ERM concluded that there was “an 
unacceptably high level of uncertainty associated with some key impact 
conclusions”79 and called for further studies of the project’s potential effects. 
Among other things, the study questioned whether Lake Cocibolca could survive 
the dredging of its bottom. While the study argued that the canal project holds the 
potential for improving conditions in Nicaragua, it also acknowledged that it carries 
with it many risks and underscored the importance of good project governance.80 At 
first, it appeared the ERM study had prompted the Nicaraguan government to 
postpone the start of construction until late 2016.81 However, on November 5th the 
Nicaraguan government issued the “environmental permit” for the project and 
HKND was confident it could proceed “with full speed”.82 
 
2.2.3 Economic Feasibility 
Another stream of criticism concerns the project’s underlying economic rationale. 
HKND and the Nicaraguan government argue that the project will profit from 
growing maritime trade and an increased use of gigantic container ships that are too 
big for the Panama Canal.83 The Nicaraguan canal would allow the passage of ships 
capable of carrying 25,000 containers and weighing up to 400,000 tons84, whereas 
the Panama Canal after its current expansion will only be able to accommodate 
12,000-container ships. The Nicaraguan government and HKND are betting that 
growth in maritime trade and ship sizes will help the canal become a successful 
enterprise.85 Governmental predictions estimate the project will double Nicaraguan 
GDP by 2020, raise incomes and create roughly 250,000 jobs once completed.86 In 
response to critics of the project, the president of the Canal Authority said the 
economic benefits of investment and jobs would easily outweigh the costs.87 
However, no independent economic feasibility study has yet been conducted to 
support these claims.88  
 
Many economists have raised concerns regarding the economic case for the canal 
and question whether Nicaragua will actually benefit from the project.89 The 
estimated cost of the project, already reevaluated from US$40 billion to US$50 
billion, is still viewed by some as overly optimistic.90 Moreover, critics point to key 
questions that dispute the competitiveness and success of the Nicaraguan canal, 
such as slower trade growth during recent years and possible rival trade routes that 
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may open up through the Arctic because of global warming.91 Others claim that 
demand for the kind of large vessels HKND and Nicaragua hope for is unlikely to 
materialize any time soon.92 
 
Moreover, many point to the relatively small amounts of direct revenue that would 
transfer to the Nicaraguan government, other than the US$10 million HKND has 
agreed to pay during the first ten years of canal operation and the subsequent rise in 
government shares in the company.93 There is also concern regarding the financing 
of the project. Many doubt that HKND will be able to raise the billions of dollars 
necessary to complete the canal, and precisely where financing will come from 
remains unknown.94 HKND has declined to name any investor backing the project 
with reference to international practice, and many speculate that the Chinese 
government is secretly supporting the project.95 In an interview, the president of the 
canal Authority hinted that he hoped for official Chinese backing and investment96, 
yet so far China has not confirmed any affiliation with the project.97 
 
2.3 Summary 
To conclude, the Nicaraguan canal project may result in long-term economic 
benefits for the nation and its people. Yet the project is surrounded by many 
uncertainties and has received plenty of critique. It may have significant social 
impact, causing the displacement of up to 120,000 Nicaraguans and affecting 
constitutional rights of several indigenous groups. In addition, it may result in 
disastrous effect on the Nicaraguan environment, among other things threatening 
the water quality of Lake Cocibolca on which more than 200 000 Nicaraguans rely 
for their drinking water. These issues and concerns should serve as a constant 
background as the thesis moves on to examine the legal preparations for the canal 
project and the content of the Nicaraguan canal agreement.  
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3 The Nicaraguan Canal Agreement 
The main part of this chapter examines the content of the Master Concession and 
Implementation Agreement in respect of the Nicaragua Canal and Development 
Project (hereafter the ‘agreement’ or the ‘MCA’). It is officially an agreement 
between four actors: the government of Nicaragua, the Nicaragua Canal and 
Development Project Commission (the ‘Commission’), the Nicaraguan interoceanic 
Grand Canal Authority (the ‘Authority’), HKND and the investor Empresa 
Desarroladora de Grandes Infraestructuras (EDGI).98 As EDGI is controlled by 
HKND, it is effectively an agreement between Nicaragua and HKND.99 Before the 
examination of the canal agreement, the thesis briefly presents the two Nicaraguan 
laws, law 800 and law 840, that paved way for the agreement.  
3.1 Law 800 
Enacted by the Nicaraguan National Assembly in July 2012, law 800 formally 
allowed for the construction of the Nicaraguan interoceanic canal. Its main purpose 
was to provide a legal framework for further regulations of the canal project.100 
Among other things, the law established the Nicaraguan Canal Authority to 
supervise the project, addressed the ownership of the canal project and sought to 
regulate land rights and environmental protection.101 Law 800 is subordinated law 
840 and the MCA, and several of its provisions were subsequently modified by 
those acts.102 Nevertheless, it gives insight into the first legal steps made to 
facilitate the investment agreement. 
 
In law 800, the Nicaraguan Canal Authority (the ‘Authority’) was tasked with 
representing the Nicaraguan government in matters concerning the canal project, 
supervising every phase of the preparatory studies, as well as the construction and 
operation of the canal.103 The Authority was also given the task of raising 
investment for the project by creating and promoting the Nicaragua Canal 
Company, intended to result in mixed public-private ownership of the canal project 
in which Nicaragua would own 51 % of the shares.104  
 
For the purpose of expropriation, law 800 declared all real estate or land rights in 
areas required for the operation of the canal to be in the public interest.105 In 
addressing the potential social impact of the project, the law established a duty for 
the Authority to inform affected populations if expropriations affected their 
territories.106 In addressing the environmental impact of the project, it established a 
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duty for the Authority to ensure its environmental sustainability.107 This duty 
included ensuring an environmental impact study, planning for a sustainable use of 
water resources, contributing to conservation and restoration of ecosystems as well 
as adapting the project to risks posed by climate change.108  
 
3.2 Law 840 
Law 840, frequently referred to as the canal concession law, was enacted in June 
2013. Passed through a contentious party line vote in the Nicaraguan parliament 
after only two days of debate, it gave the approval for the government to sign the 
agreement with HKND and also afforded the agreement special status under 
Nicaraguan law.109 Preparations for an agreement with HKND had been made well 
before: in the fall of 2012 Nicaragua had signed both a memorandum of 
understanding and a deed of cooperation with the corporation.110   
 
Law 840 created a new entity, the Nicaragua Canal and Development Project 
Commission, and transferred all obligations of the Authority over to the 
Commission.111 More importantly, the law made significant changes to the previous 
framework created by law 800. It changed the structure of ownership for the canal 
project, reducing the number of shares owned by the government of Nicaragua 
from 51 % to 1 %.112 Significantly, it appears to have given the MCA the status of 
law by incorporating all provisions of the agreement into law 840. Any other law 
that impedes or contradict the obligations or rights afforded under the MCA, were 
deemed inapplicable to the canal project.113 For further facilitation of the canal 
agreement, the law modified and removed any other legislation that explicitly or 
implicitly contradicted its wording or the wording of the MCA.114 It specifically 
removed certain provisions of law 800 concerning the rate of public ownership in 
the canal project and Authority’s abilities. It also removed regulations concerning 
public property and public interest, instead referring to the content of the MCA.115  
 
In sum, law 840 and the MCA are given a very special status under Nicaraguan 
law. They are also afforded strong protection from the legislature itself. According 
to article 23, a majority of 60 % of the votes is required in the Nicaraguan assembly 
to amend, change or remove the law.116 The variation between law 800 and law 840 
documents how Nicaragua changed its ownership ambitions in the canal project 
significantly, from 51 % to 1 %. As presented, law 840 and the MCA are 
interconnected and several provisions of law 840 also overlap with the MCA. For 
the sake of clarity and the thesis’ particular focus on the concession agreement, 
those provisions are presented as part of the MCA.  
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3.3 The Master Concession and Implementation 
Agreement  
3.3.1 Investor Rights and Ownership of the Project 
To this date, the Master Concession and Implementation Agreement is the most 
detailed regulation of the canal project that is publically available. It creates a 
framework for the project and divides it into several sub projects, including the 
construction of the canal, an airport, roads, two ports and the establishment of a free 
trade zone.117 The agreement grants HKND the exclusive right and authority to 
develop and operate the canal project and its sub projects, to use and receive any 
and all benefits arising from the projects, as well as to collect tolls and any other 
charges from any person utilizing any portion of the canal or the other sub projects 
under an extensive period of time. The concession period stretches 50 years from 
the first date of commercial canal operation, but the investor may extend the 
concession by another 50 years.118 During the concession period, HKND and its 
affiliates are not subject to any taxation by the Nicaragua state. The government has 
agreed to ensure that all project affiliates and investors shall be exempted from any 
requirements to pay taxes or other duties.119    
 
HKND and its investors will own 99 % by the beginning of the concession period 
and the remaining 1 % will be owned by the Nicaraguan state. Beginning after 10 
years of commercial operation, ownership will be transferred to the Nicaraguan 
state by 10 % per decade. During the first then years of operation, HKND will pay 
the Nicaraguan government US$10 million, minus potential deductions for current 
debt it deems it is owed. 120 This initial monetary compensation and the transfer of 
shares in HKND to the Nicaraguan state serves as the “full and final compensation” 
for the granting of the concession.121 
 
3.3.1.1 The Right to Expropriate 
The agreement gives HKND wide-ranging rights to expropriate land at its own 
discretion, with the assistance of the Nicaraguan state. Under the agreement, the 
Commission must ensure the investor legal title of ownership to all land that may 
be “reasonably necessary or desirable”122 to develop and operate any part of the 
project, free and clear of any legal claims to such land such as hypothecation, 
mortgage or other restrictions. Such a title of ownership includes the exclusive 
rights of the investor to possess, occupy, use or perform any activities upon such 
property.123 Further, the Nicaraguan state must ensure that all such property remain 
in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the investor during the entire concession 
period. In the event of any obstruction by persons claiming right, title or interest in 
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sub project assets or sites, the government shall defend the investor and take all 
steps necessary to provide the investor with unencumbered use of project land and 
infrastructure, and keep the investor indemnified against all losses that the investor 
may suffer from the action.124 
  
In the event of expropriation, the investor is required to pay compensation to the 
owners of the property, yet this obligation is not followed by any specification of 
how such compensation will be calculated.125 The MCA does however contain a 
definition of an “Expropriation Value”, defined as the lesser of the taxed value of 
such property and the price at which such property would transfer in “an arms’ 
length sale between unaffiliated parties in an open market at the date of this 
Agreement”126. The exact implications of this for each individual expropriation 
remain unclear.  
 
Other than the aforementioned obligation to compensate private property owners 
for their land in the event of expropriation, the investor has little duties towards 
affected parts of the Nicaraguan population. According to the MCA, the 
government shall ensure that the investor face no other liability of compensation in 
the event of expropriation. Specifically, the agreement establishes a governmental 
responsibility to ensure that the investor has no obligation to any person in 
connection with the relocation and resettlement of any people or communities 
currently situated in areas to be utilized by or in connection to any of the sub 
projects.127  
 
To conclude, the rights afforded HKND and its investors under the agreement are 
generous. In return for its investment, HKND will own the exclusive rights to 
develop and operate the canal project and receive all benefits thereof. It will be able 
to expropriate Nicaraguan land at its own discretion along the canal route and in 
connection to any of the other sub projects. Additionally, the investors are 
completely exempted from any taxes during a potential 100-year concession period 
and the government has committed to protect and indemnify the investor vis-à-vis 
any claims that may arise during the project. In return, Nicaragua receives little 
direct revenue and will only gradually, beginning after 10 years of operation, 
increase its ownership in HKND. The state will slowly reap more of the benefits of 
the project as their shares in HKND increase. However, it will take 60 to 70 years 
before Nicaragua becomes a majority shareholder in the company.128  
 
It must be noted that the basic structure of the Nicaraguan canal agreement is to 
some extent characteristic for concession agreements between host states and 
foreign investors, especially in developing countries. Modern concession 
agreements often follow a similar structure to that of the Nicaraguan canal 
agreement, in which a private entity develops, constructs and operates the project 
and eventually transfer the project to the government. As part of such agreements, 
foreign investors usually require certain assurances from the government, including 
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an exclusive right to undertake and exploit the project, assistance in the acquisition 
of land rights and the enjoyment of tax benefits.129 Thus, the Nicaraguan agreement 
is connected to the broader use of concession agreements in developing countries, 
which in turn increases the importance of its examination.   
 
Undeniably, investors are granted certain rights in return for their commitment to 
invest. Yet the rights granted under the Nicaraguan agreement are of a remarkable 
magnitude and put the foreign investors in a highly privileged position, both with 
respect to the Nicaraguan state and the rights of Nicaraguans at large. How come a 
sovereign nation would grant such rights to a foreign private entity that affect large 
swaths of its own territory? The imbalance in rights between the investor and 
Nicaragua cannot be explained simply as a result of commitment of capital and the 
bargaining between two actors. Rather, there appears to be an imbalance in these 
provisions of the agreement that has historical and legal overtones. This hypothesis 
is furthered strengthened by the fact that agreements of similar structure are 
common in developing countries. Moreover, the content of the agreement hints at 
the fundamental conflict of interests between the foreign investor and the host state. 
Its imbalance will only become more prominent as I move on to examine the 
provisions affecting the legislative and regulatory power of the state of Nicaragua.  
 
3.3.2 Demands on Legislative and Regulatory Action  
Several provisions of the agreement affect the legislative and regulatory ability of 
the Nicaraguan state, making demands on national legislative and regulatory action 
for its facilitation. The Nicaraguan government undertakes to use its best 
endeavours to ensure that each law and amendments to existing laws, that is 
necessary or desirable, shall be passed, enacted, published and gain the full force of 
a statute. This legislative process is to be carried out on an “expedited basis” and 
includes a governmental obligation to propose laws to the National Assembly of 
Nicaragua. It also includes the implementation of any other rules or regulations 
necessary to facilitate the agreement. After the enactment or implementation of 
such laws and regulations, the government shall ensure that the statutes are 
maintained, enforced and abided by each government entity.130  
 
The demands on national legislative action also include changes to the Nicaraguan 
Constitution, in order to make valid and binding certain provisions of the 
agreement. The provisions in question regulate the right of the investor to 
determine any tolls, tariffs, fees or other charges to be paid by persons utilizing any 
portion of the sub project assets, as well as the delivery and execution of a 
Sovereign Immunity Waiver from the Central Bank of Nicaragua with respect to 
the agreement.131 In the agreement, the parties declared the intention to present an 
amendment to the National Assembly of Nicaragua in order to ensure that those 
actions are considered in accordance with Nicaraguan law. This amendment was to 
be presented to the National Assembly of Nicaragua and passed “as soon as 
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practicable” 132. Despite significant protests by canal opponents and political 
opposition, the National Assembly passed the required amendment in February 
2014.133 
 
3.3.3 Legislative and Regulatory Protection of the 
Investor 
Another core element of the agreement affecting the legislative and regulatory 
ability of the Nicaraguan state are the limitations set by the concepts of  “Change in 
Law” and “Political Force Majeure Event”, which if triggered result in a number of 
obligations for the Nicaraguan government. The concept of “Change in Law” is 
constituted of a number of actions. First, a repeal, in whole or in part, or a 
modification of or an amendment to any law, affecting any part of the project or an 
investor, as well as the enforceability of any part of the agreement, constitute a  
“Change in Law”. Second, any enactment, adoption or making of new law or 
requirement for any form of consent affecting, directly or indirectly, the project or 
its sponsors or the enforceability of any part of the agreement constitute a “Change 
in Law”. Moreover, cancellations, non-renewals of, or an “adverse change” in the 
qualifications, conditions or restrictions applicable to any project consent or the 
issuance, renewal or modification thereof constitute a “Change in Law”. Any 
imposition of a new requirement for a sub project or the sponsor to obtain 
permission, as well as a change in the manner in which any relevant law or 
requirement is applied or enforced or interpreted by a government entity also falls 
under the definition.134   
 
The concept of “Political Force Majeure Event” establishes additional limitations to 
Nicaragua’s regulatory and legislative power. It includes some more typical cases 
of political force majeure, such as acts of war, invasions, armed conflicts and acts 
of terrorism within the country.135 Other examples of such cases involve violent 
demonstrations, public disorder and civil commotion or sabotage. However, many 
other events related to the actions of the Nicaraguan state are considered to be 
“Political Force Majeure Events”. Examples of such events include any action or 
inaction of the government that prohibit, delay or otherwise restrict any investor or 
project affiliate.136 Moreover, if any sub project sponsor does not obtain a 
governmental consent necessary to develop and operate the sub project in a manner 
determined at the investor’s discretion that constitutes a “Political Force Majeure 
Event”. Further, the issuance or making of any law, order, ban or declaration by any 
government entity, including national courts, in respect of archaeological or 
paleontological items or remains discovered on any project site constitute a 
“Political Force Majeure Event”. So do any regulations that directly affect the 
revenue of the project in any way, as well as any condition or qualification to any 
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part of the project consent which has the effect of restricting, impeding, delaying or 
reducing the transfer of any amounts yielded by such sub project.137  
 
To understand the effects of the occurrence of a “Change in Law” or a “Political 
Force Majeure Events”, one must turn to two other legal concepts of the MCA, 
“Destabilising Event” and Destabilising Event Situation”. Any event considered a 
“Political Force Majeure Event” or a “Change in Law”, as well any other change to 
sub project consents by the Nicaraguan government, is considered a “Destabilising 
Event”. In turn, a “Destabilising Event” may, both indirectly and directly, give rise 
to a “Destabilising Event Situation”, the occurrence of which establishes a number 
of obligations for the Nicaraguan government and releases the affected investor 
from certain obligations.138  
 
The term “Destabilising Event Situation” is very broad in scope. Such a Situation 
arises if the Nicaraguan state, in violation any of the limitations of its legislative or 
regulatory power set up in the agreement, act in a way that result in any sort of 
failure or delay on behalf of the investor to comply with its obligations under the 
agreement. Such a Situation also arises in the event of any changes to rights, 
benefits and obligations of any of the sub project parties. Moreover, if Nicaragua’s 
actions result in any costs to or loss in revenue of any sub project party, that too 
constitutes a “Destabilising Event Situation”.139 
 
If a “Destabilising Event Situation” occurs, the Nicaraguan government has a 
number of obligations towards the investor and its affiliates.  First, it is to 
indemnify and keep indemnified the affected investor and its affiliates and hold 
them harmless from the “Destabilising Event Situation” and its effects. Second, it 
must pay compensation equal to all losses directly or indirectly incurred, suffered 
or paid by the affected investor and its affiliates. Thirdly, the government shall take 
all other actions necessary to put the affected investor or affiliate in the same 
position in which it would have been in had such “Destabilising Event” not 
occurred.140  
 
In addition, the occurrence of a “Political Force Majeure Event” alone results in 
additional obligations for the Nicaraguan government. Its occurrence excuses the 
investor from any performance and it shall not be considered in default of any 
obligation under the agreement to the extent that lack of performance is due to the 
event. Any time limits or deadlines for the performances by the affected investor or 
its affiliates shall be extended by a period equal to the period of the Political Force 
Majeure. Also, any fixed costs during the time a sub project is unable to be 
developed or operated properly due to a Political Force Majeure Event are to be 
covered by the Nicaraguan Government.141  
 
To summarize, the described provisions have significant effects on Nicaragua’s 
regulatory and legislative ability. They enable the investors to steer Nicaraguan 
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legislative and regulatory action through the agreement, to the extent that it has 
prompted an amendment to the country’s constitution. Moreover, the provisions of 
“Change in Law” and “Political Force Majeure Event” ensure a blanket protection 
of the investor towards any action from the Nicaraguan state. To be clear, these 
provisions do not explicitly exempt the project and the investor from any new 
regulations, yet any Nicaraguan legislation or regulatory action that in any way 
affect the investor results in an obligation on behalf of the state to compensate the 
investors for all losses that directly or indirectly result from such regulations. 
Notably, this investment protection does not make exemptions for any regulation or 
legislation enacted in the public interest, be it for social or environmental reasons, 
despite the magnitude of the project and the risks associated with it. Furthermore, 
Nicaragua has to bear the fixed costs of the affected investor during any resulting 
delay to the project.  
 
The provisions that limit the Nicaraguan legislative and regulatory ability in the 
agreement are a form of so-called “stabilization clauses”.142 Specifically, they are a 
form of hybrid stabilization clauses that require Nicaragua both to restore the 
original economic equilibrium of the contract if it is impacted by a change in law, 
and to compensate the investor for any losses suffered as a result of any new 
legislation or regulation. Such clauses have been widely used in various forms in 
investor-state contracts and regularly so in the infrastructure and transportation 
sector. The clauses take different forms but are often wide in scope, apply 
throughout the life of the investment and serve to protect foreign investments.143 
Notably, this kind of stabilization clauses appear to be much more common in 
developing countries and often include protection of the investor from any 
legislation regardless of purpose.144 Thus, these provisions of the agreement are 
again connected to the broader use of investment agreements in developing 
countries.  
 
The similarities of these provisions of Nicaraguan canal agreement to other 
agreements in developing states, further motivates a study of their origins. The 
comprehensive protection of the investors and their rights under the agreement may 
seriously impair the Nicaragua’s ability to regulate and legislate. How come a 
sovereign state enters into an agreement of this nature, granting generous rights and 
allowing foreign investors to steer legislation while shielding their activity on 
Nicaraguan territory from any effects of Nicaraguan legislative and regulatory 
action? Again, this imbalance between investor and state in the agreement cannot 
simply be explained as a result of a bargaining between two actors, but appears to 
have historical and legal overtones. Lastly, to fully account for the standing of these 
provisions, I present the terms of amendment and termination as well as the 
provisions on governing law and dispute resolution in the agreement.  
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3.3.4 Amendment and Termination 
The Nicaraguan government has undertaken not to challenge the validity or 
enforceability of any provision of the agreement. Likewise, any effort to amend the 
agreement requires the consent of each party to the concession agreement. 
However, the ability to terminate the concession or any of its sub projects varies 
between the parties.145 For example, if the investor determines that a sub project for 
any reason is not viable or that it should not be developed or operated, it has a right 
to terminate the concession for that sub project.146 If the financing of a sub project 
does not meet the financing requirements of the project within 72 months of the 
date of the agreement, or the project is not successfully completed within 10 years 
of its financing, both parties have the right to terminate the concession in that 
part.147 Moreover, there is a right to terminate in the event of default with respect to 
a sub project for both parties. This right also exists in the event of different cases of 
prolonged force majeure. In the event of a natural force majeure, which continues 
for a continuous period of 12 months or an aggregate of 360 days or more within 24 
months, both parties have the right to terminate the agreement regarding the 
affected sub projects. In the event of a prolonged political force majeure, which for 
a continuous period of sixty days or more or an aggregate of 90 days within a 
period of 120 days, the investor has the right to terminate the concession with 
respect to the relevant sub project.148 
 
3.3.5  Governing Law and Dispute Resolution   
The agreement and any dispute arising out of it are governed and determined in 
accordance with the laws of Nicaragua and “such rules of international law as may 
be applicable”.149 However, this should be viewed in light of the blanket economic 
protection of the investor against any legislative or regulatory action of the 
Nicaraguan state. Furthermore, disputes arising out of or in connection with the 
agreement shall be submitted exclusively to international arbitration. Nicaragua has 
waived any right of sovereign immunity “to the fullest possible extent”,150 which 
enables the investor to bring a cause of action against the government without the 
government’s consent.151 The party that initiates the arbitration may turn to either 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the 
International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
to settle the dispute.152 Thus, the agreement is enforceable under international 
arbitration.    
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3.4 Summary 
To conclude, the above-described clauses buttress the imbalances previously found 
in the agreement and further strengthen the protection of the agreement already 
afforded under national law. Nicaragua has unequivocally bound itself to the 
agreement and cannot alter it without consent of the investors. Meanwhile, the 
investors have greater possibilities to terminate the agreement and the interpretation 
of the agreement and any disputes arising out of it will be settled through 
international arbitration. Judging by these provisions it appears as if Nicaragua has 
entered what can almost be described as a treaty with another sovereign, in which 
Nicaragua’s possibility to exercise any powers in the interests of its people result in 
numerous obligations towards HKND. This structure appears enigmatic; after all it 
is an agreement between a private investor and the state, concerning a matter of the 
state’s territory. Yet it adds to the fundamental imbalance of the agreement and 
calls for a further investigation into the nature of the agreement beyond the present.  
 
While the Nicaraguan canal project might be unique in scope, investment 
agreements of similar structure and with similar level of foreign investment 
protection are common, particularly in the developing world. It is a structure that 
has taken the following expressions in the Nicaraguan canal agreement. The 
investor has been granted the exclusive right to develop and operate the project, 
will pay no taxes or fees and is granted the ability to expropriate land at its own 
discretion. Moreover, it is also able to make demands on Nicaraguan legislative 
action and has already been able to prompt an amendment to the country’s 
constitution. Meanwhile, the investor is shielded from the effects of any legislative 
or regulatory action on behalf of Nicaragua that would affect any of its rights under 
the agreement. In addition, Nicaragua can do nothing to alter the agreement without 
the consent of the investor and all potential disputes arising out of the agreement 
are subject exclusively to international arbitration. This structure should be viewed 
in light of the great risks inherent to the project and the potentially disastrous social 
and environmental effects it may have for Nicaragua and part of its population.     
 
How come an agreement of this nature regulates what is arguably Nicaragua’s most 
important project in history? And how come foreign private investors are able to 
achieve contracts with similar rights and investment protection in developing 
countries? Undeniably, any investment agreement is to some extent the result of the 
bargaining between different parties. Yet the inequities found in the Nicaraguan 
canal agreement are so fundamental that they cannot simply be viewed solely as a 
product of this bargaining. Moreover, the agreement’s explicit connection to 
international legal rules and the similarities in practice in other developing 
countries imply a connection to the broader context of international rules on foreign 
investment protection. This further strengthens the thesis’ hypothesis that historical 
legal factors are at play and have helped shape the basis of this agreement. For a 
complete explanation of the agreement’s content and structure, it must therefore be 
placed in the context of the historical development of the international law on 
foreign investment protection – international investment law – and the fundamental 
conflicts that have shaped it.  
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The history of international investment law and its connection to the present is 
disputed. Many legal scholars argue that past controversies over the meaning of 
international investment law have little relevance today.153 Historic controversies 
between capital-importing and capital-exporting states have been overcome today, 
it is said, by more than 3000 investment agreements. This argument presents 
international investment law’s past as irrelevant and separates it from the political 
conflicts and controversies that created it. In contrast, I argue that the principles of 
international investment law were formed through the protection of foreign 
investments and emerged from claims made in a context of exploitation and 
political contest between capital-exporting and capital-importing states.154 As the 
following chapter will show, concession agreements served as an important 
instrument throughout this process155 and their legal nature has been formed to 
serve similar interests.156   
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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4 The Historical Development of 
International Investment Law  
To explain the phenomenon of the Nicaraguan agreement and its effects on the 
legislative and regulatory ability of the Nicaraguan state, this chapter examines the 
historical development of the rules on foreign investment protection based on the 
theories of Kate Miles. First, it describes the origins of international investment law 
and the use of concession agreements in the 19th century (4.1). Thereafter, the 
chapter examines the broader conflicts over the content of international investment 
law between capital-exporting and capital-importing states in the 19th and 20th 
century (4.2 & 4.3). In connection to this examination follows a presentation of the 
debate over the internationalization of concessions and its effect for the content of 
such agreements (4.4). Finally, the chapter describes the emergence of the BIT 
regime and the increasing use of stabilization clauses in investment agreements, 
connecting these trends to the fundamental conflicts that have shaped the 
international rules on foreign investment protection and the Nicaraguan canal 
agreement (4.5).  
 
4.1 The Origins of International Investment Law 
and the Use of Concessions 
Modern international investment law and the rules on the protection of foreign 
investment originate from reciprocal agreements between European states that were 
made during the 17th and 18th century. These states, which possessed fairly equal 
bargaining power, sought to secure mutual minimum standards of treatment for 
actors engaged in investment activity within their territories.157 Many agreements 
were made in the form of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, which have 
often been described as the first generation of bilateral investment treaties.158 Such 
treaties addressed a wide range of subjects related to nationals of the state parties 
and focused on protecting individuals and their property: guaranteeing freedom of 
movement, ensuring rights to trade and enabling foreigners to use local courts to 
enforce their claims. Together, these agreements created a network of reciprocal 
trade protection measures and formed a framework for international protection of 
foreign capital in Europe.159  
 
At the time of the European commercial and legal expansion in the early 19th 
century, European rules protecting foreign individuals and their property were not 
the only system governing such interactions. Regulations of trade and other forms 
of international interaction existed in other continents as well, as groups of nations 
and peoples had developed international legal regimes to govern their interactions. 
The significance of this for the development of international law is that European 
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nations were not creating legal regimes on a blank canvas. Rather, processes of 
political and jurisdictional contest took place and different legal systems vied for 
supremacy as European nations expanded their global influence.160 These 
processes, and the imposition of European foreign investment protection rules, 
coincided with the increasing migration of capital and the emergence of the global 
economy. Beginning in 1820, the colonial era also became an era of international 
investment. According to legal scholar Kenneth Vandevelde, this transformation 
was triggered by at least three major events. The first was the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars in 1815, which was followed by almost a century of relative peace in Europe. 
A second trigger was the industrial revolution, which generated an enormous 
demand for imported raw materials and resulted in reduced transportation costs. A 
third triggering event was the emergence of liberal economic theory, which 
emphasized the promotion of exports and promoted free international trade to 
create national wealth.161 
 
As European capital-exporting states sought to establish international rules to 
protect their investments outside of the continent, the reciprocal character of their 
international investment rules changed fundamentally. Out of self-interest, 
European states had practiced self-restraint regarding foreign investors among 
themselves. Any arbitrary seizures of property or use of coercion would inevitably 
disrupt a state’s own commercial relations. However, outside of their own continent 
European nations enjoyed few reciprocal relationships with developing nations and 
both could and had to exert considerably more force to ensure the protection of 
their nationals and their investments in these countries. As a result, foreign 
investment protection law moved from a base in reciprocity to one of imposition.162 
Subsequently, treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with non-European 
states often became a first step in establishing a more intrusive European presence 
in these nations. The treaties were interpreted increasingly in European favor as the 
military and political power of European states grew, limiting the host state 
sovereignty to further trade and investment rights for European entities. This 
process became closely linked to colonialism, military interventions and a coercive 
protection of commercial interests.163 That natural resources of host states and 
colonized nations were commodities for the use of Western interests was a view 
inherent to this process.164  
 
The process of commercial and political expansionism was both facilitated by 
international investment law and helped shape its content. Capital-exporting states 
directed the evolution of international investment law through the use of force and 
the assertion of foreign investment protection as existing international law. 
Inevitably, European states shared a common understanding of the international 
legal principles governing foreign investments that reflected their interests and 
accentuated the obligations of nations to facilitate trade and investment. Repeated 
assertions of those obligations, as well as the legitimacy of actions taken to enforce 
them, contributed to solidifying these views as rules of international law. Thus, 
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international investment law both served as an important tool and evolved 
throughout the process of the Western expansion.165  
 
The acquiring of concession agreements was an important part in the effort to 
establish European notions of property rights as international law.166 Concessions 
were used to supply elements that capital-exporting states deemed to be lacking in 
host countries, effectively inserting a European legal order to protect home states’ 
investors.167 Generally, such concessions concerned public utilities, such as the 
construction and operation of railways, canals or the exploration and exploitation of 
mineral or timber resources.168 The rights granted were often wide-ranging and 
gave broadly defined jurisdiction to private investors for long periods of time. 
Concessions frequently gave special privileges to the concessionaire as well, in the 
form of tax exemptions, limited or full monopoly or guaranteed rates of return on 
capital. As legal historian Cyrus R. Veeser explains: “although some legal 
historians deny that privileges were intrinsic to concessions, in practice they usually 
were, in colonies as well as in sovereign states”.169  
 
During the second half of the 19th century, European states increased diplomatic 
pressure to secure concessions, often as part of wider aims to expand political and 
commercial influence. For example, Britain applied an interventionist policy to 
every concession that was deemed to be politically important. If it were viewed to 
be in Britain’s political interest to obtain a particular concession, the government 
would pressure the host state, through the use of force if necessary.170 States and 
private investors collaborated to obtain such concessions. Investors such as the 
English East India Company were granted great powers by their home states to 
enter agreements and gain wide-ranging rights within host territories, which helped 
establish a network of European political and commercial influence.171 The transfer 
of economic and jurisdictional control that often followed from such concessions 
contributed to the process of spreading European based notions of property 
rights.172 
 
Once obtained, concessions were protected by military force of the home state and 
any coercive actions of the investor’s home state was legitimized with reference to 
international rules on investment protection. The invocation of international 
property rights by concessionaires and their reiteration by the home state were 
assertions of the principles of the content of the law, but also served in the creation 
of its principles. Inevitably, such assertions reflected their capital-exporting 
interests and focused on the protection of their nationals’ investments and 
property.173 The enforcement and protection of concessions and other foreign 
investments were closely connected to the establishment of an alignment between 
state and investor interests under international law and the assertions of an 
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international minimum standard for the protection of foreign investments.174 These 
efforts were met with resistance from capital-importing states who disputed the 
legal privileges of foreign investors.175 The unfolding conflict between capital-
exporting and capital-importing states in the 19th century and onwards encapsulates 
the fundamental tensions and conflict of interests concerning the treatment of 
foreign investments that have characterized international investment law ever since.  
 
For the purpose of explaining the Nicaraguan canal agreement, it important to 
conclude that the foundation of the modern principles of foreign investment law can 
be traced to this era of European expansionism in the 19th century. International 
rules on the protection of foreign investment and the acquiring of concessions 
facilitated this expansion and were shaped in the process. Inevitably, these rules 
aimed to protect home states’ investments abroad and did not place emphasis on the 
interests of capital-importing states or consider the complexities of the environment 
in which they were made. Already, this examination illustrates the fundamental 
conflict of interest between capital-exporting states and host states. By tracing this 
pattern and the development of international investment law further, the connection 
between these historical origins and the Nicaraguan canal agreement become 
clearer.  
 
4.2 Diplomatic Protection, the International 
Minimum Standard and the Calvo Doctrine 
During the second half of the 19th century, international legal rules on the 
protection of foreign investment developed within a branch of international law 
known as the diplomatic protection of aliens. The doctrine was based on the 
premise that any injury incurred by a foreigner in another was an injury incurred by 
his or her state. Accordingly, it permitted states to take action on their national’s 
behalf, either diplomatically or through the use of force.176 The doctrine of 
diplomatic protection established an international minimum standard for the 
treatment of aliens, described by its proponents as a ”moral standard for civilized 
states”.177 The standard set up a number of preconditions for the expropriation of 
foreign property: it had to be carried out for a public purpose, it could not be 
arbitrary or discriminatory and prompt, adequate and effective compensation had to 
be paid. Notably, the standard’s scope did not include consideration of social or 
economic needs of the host state, the capacity of a state to pay the compensation 
amount, or previous investor conduct.178 In favor of such a standard, capital-
exporting states of Europe and North America argued that equal protection under 
national law at times would result in insufficient protection of foreign investors. 
Therefore, it was argued, the international minimum standard rather than national 
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law should apply to investors and their investments if national law was considered 
under-developed or failed to meet standards of justice and equity.179  
 
During the 19th century, claims under international diplomatic protection in the 
aftermath of expropriations were common, particularly in Latin America.180 
Expropriations by home states were rarely large-scale, yet minor skirmishes and 
incidents of seizures of property were common and included property of 
concessionaires.181 Starting in the 1870s, countless concessions had been granted 
and this trend would continue several decades into the 1900s.182 Leaders of many 
developing states had granted concessions voluntarily despite frequent public 
opposition, often presenting concessions as essential mechanisms for modernizing 
the economy. However, many concessions that were ostensibly aimed at economic 
development were often close to fraudulent and sparked controversies due to their 
exploitive nature. Even though many developing states, particularly Latin American 
ones, had welcomed investments and used concessions to reassure foreign 
investors, they resisted their local influence and protection by foreign powers.183 In 
particular, the assertion of an international minimum standard to govern foreign 
investments was met with persistent resistance by many Latin American states.  
 
For many host states, the frequent invocations of diplomatic protection together 
with treaties and concessions became a source of grievance that inspired efforts to 
change the norms regulating international investment. Seeking to shield their 
regulatory power and jurisdiction and alter the nature of foreign investment 
protection, they argued that investment regulation and expropriation of foreign 
property were matters of domestic jurisdiction. They further asserted that the 
doctrine of state sovereignty precluded interference by other governments in 
disputes over the treatment of foreigners and their property rights. Carlos Calvo, a 
prominent Argentine lawyer, was the first to systemize the elements of this claim at 
a legal level in 1868. This doctrine came to be known as the Calvo Doctrine, but is 
also referred to as the standard of national treatment.184 The doctrine stipulated 
equality before the law between nationals and foreigners and that aliens who 
established themselves in a country had the same rights to protection as nationals of 
that country, but could not lay claims on a more extended protection.185 In short, as 
long as a state did not discriminate against foreign investors it was not violating any 
rules of customary international law.186  
 
Many developing countries put considerable emphasis in their foreign policy on 
principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interventionism.187 
Newly independent Latin American countries adopted this position and frequently 
required the insertion of a so-called “Calvo Clause” into investment contracts 
concluded with foreigners, under which the investor committed to refrain from 
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seeking diplomatic protection in a dispute with the host state and instead turn to 
local remedies.188 However, countries like Britain and the United States declared 
that the Calvo Clause did not in any way affect their rights and duties under 
international law, but could only be a factor in determining whether or not a state 
would intervene on behalf of their national. Such statements coupled with military 
action by capital-exporting states enforced their view of international law and were 
simultaneously also part of the creation of international legal rules protecting 
foreign investors.189  
 
Because of the military and economic strength of capital-exporting states, they were 
able to enforce their perspective as law and frame foreign investment protection as 
part of state responsibility, focusing on the protection of the investor and 
connecting the interest of state and investor through the doctrine of diplomatic 
protection.190 Generally, capital-exporting states adopted practices on intervention 
under diplomatic protection that suited their political and commercial interests. If 
deemed necessary, states were willing to use considerable force to enforce their 
view of international law and protect their foreign investments.191 For example, in 
the 1850s the United States sent a fully armed naval fleet to Paraguay in response to 
an alleged expropriation of property belonging to an American company, 
pressuring Paraguay into agreeing to submit the claim to a tribunal for 
settlement.192 In the early 20th century, Britain and Germany bombarded the 
Venezuelan capital Caracas to ensure compensation for nationals whose property 
had been destroyed during the civil war and forced Venezuela, which insisted on 
the exclusive jurisdiction of its local courts, to consent to international 
arbitration.193 Such violent instances illustrate the highly polarized positions of 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states over the rules of foreign investment 
protection. Ultimately, the efforts on behalf of host states to influence international 
law were unsuccessful and the Calvo doctrine was not accepted as a rule of 
international law.194 Instead, the minimum standard was used to alter the 
presumption that an alien who was conducting business abroad had submitted 
himself to the local jurisdiction and law of that country.195 This presumption 
enabled capital-exporting states to exert control over the investment protection 
process in foreign nations. 196  
 
To conclude, international investment law evolved in the 19th century as a 
mechanism that sought to protect the interests of foreign investors and their home 
states. The process involved repetitive assertions by capital-exporting states of their 
viewpoint as representing international law, often imposed through the use of force 
or other coercive measures. The conflict that emerged during the 19th century 
illustrates the highly polarized positions of capital-importing and capital-exporting 
states and the fundamental conflict of interests over the treatment of foreign 
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investment. Foreign investment and concessions were not undesired by developing 
states, yet their legal status and protection undeniably proved to be great sources of 
conflict. Already in the 19th century, the granting of concession agreements was a 
double-edged sword for developing states, as power asymmetries enabled foreign 
investors to gain very favorable concessions and enjoy protection by their host 
states. Provisions that might appear self-evident in the Nicaraguan agreement, such 
as the international dispute resolution and the limitations on the state’s legislative 
and regulatory power, are issues that were subject to intense and violent conflicts 
between capital-exporting and capital-importing states already in the 19th century. 
Throughout the 20th century, similar asymmetries of power would continue to shape 
international rules on foreign investment protection to reflect the interests of 
capital-exporting states through a process of assertion and creation. In the following 
presentation, a particular emphasis is placed on the developments of the second half 
of the 20th century.  
 
4.3 20th Century: Recurring Patterns of Conflict 
During the first half of the 20th century, further important conflicts over the content 
of international rules on the protection of foreign property occurred as challenges 
were made by host states to alter the principles of foreign investment protection. 
One of the most significant challenges occurred as part of widespread land reforms 
after World War I in states such as Mexico, the Soviet Union and several Eastern 
European states, which led to extensive uncompensated confiscations of land. 
These states challenged investor protection rules and the content of the international 
minimum standard by asserting a right to seize property for social purposes, 
“nationalization”, arguing that it differed from previous forms of expropriation and 
exempted a government for any obligation to pay compensation. Inevitably, such 
reforms posed a major threat to foreign investments. Nationalizations were met by 
intense opposition from investors and their home states, who reiterated their 
assertion of a right to compensation under international law. This opposition also 
served to further entrench capital-exporting states’ views as international law.197  
 
One dispute in particular between Mexico and the United States over land rights 
and oil operations would give rise to a principle of long-lasting importance for 
international law, the so-called ‘Hull Formula’. Following the Mexican 
nationalizations, the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, asserted the American 
position that “adequate, effective and prompt payment” for seizure of foreign-
owned property was required under international law and rejected the validity of 
any exemption for social need.198 In his communiqué to Mexico, Hull underscored 
that the real issue was not whether Mexico should pursue social and economic 
policies designed to improve the standard of living of its people, but whether in 
doing so the property of American nationals could be taken without prompt 
payment of just compensation under international law. This statement captured the 
viewpoint of capital-exporting states generally. Moreover, this understanding of 
international law was supported in writings of legal experts, decisions from arbitral 
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tribunals and entities such as the International Law Association. The reactions of 
capital-exporting states to such nationalizations and its support among legal experts 
during this time, was used to assert the validity of the Hull formula demanding 
compensation according to international law in the event of expropriation. Attempts 
by host states to shape the content of international investment law were rejected and 
also triggered a response that enabled a reassertion of the content of international 
investment law.199 This pattern of host states challenges to the rules of international 
investment law and hostile responses from capital-exporting states would occur 
with renewed strength during the decolonization process after World War II.   
 
4.3.1 The New International Economic Order  
In the years after World War II, calls for a new international economic order 
(NIEO) surfaced as part of a campaign directed at systemic impacts of colonialism 
and wider issues of economic injustice. Newly independent states sought to change 
old doctrines to which they were ostensibly bound, but had played no role in 
formulating under colonial rule. As part of this movement, developing states, which 
regarded customary international law as biased against their interests came together 
with the post colonies and used the law-making mechanism of the United 
Nations.200 Relying particularly on the Calvo Doctrine, they attempted to create 
new doctrines of international investment law and reorient the international rules of 
foreign investment protection. 201 One of the most important examples of the 
campaign for a NIEO was the effort to grant new states permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources (PSNR). A key strategy of this movement was the attempt to 
allow states to revisit concessions granted by colonial authorities, based on the 
understanding that national law governed these concessions and that the contracts 
had ceased at the extinction of the colonial territory.202 
 
The PSNR effort became an important instrument by which new states sought to 
regain control over their own natural resources and use them to promote their own 
welfare.203 In 1962, the General Assembly passed Resolution 1803 on the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over national resources204, which contained repeated 
references to the sovereignty of the state and the fundamental importance of 
sovereign control over natural resources in the promotion of economic 
development.205 Developing states later came together to reinforce their approach in 
stronger terms through the adoption of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (CERDS)206, stating that compensation would be determined under 
national laws and disputes over compensation be settled by national courts. The 
adoption of the charter was preceded by polarized debates between developed and 
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developing nations in the UN, but the sheer number of developing states in the 
General Assembly enabled the adoption without any amendment.207 
 
In sum, both the 1962 and the 1974 resolutions served to back attempts at 
strengthening developing states’ regulatory capabilities and emphasizing investor 
responsibilities.208 The movement for a new international economic order and the 
recurrent attempts by developing states to change international law once again put 
foreign investments at risk. Many of the natural resources in the post colonies and 
developing states had been subject to foreign-owned concessions to investors from 
the developed world, often at extraordinarily favorable terms and more often than 
not occurring as a result of direct coercion.209 Unsurprisingly, many capital-
exporting states vigorously objected to the propositions made by the newly 
independent and developing states. They rejected the rule-creating potential of the 
NIEO instruments on the grounds that they had not been supported by developed 
states, and accordingly did not represent any unanimity amongst states or provide 
evidence of any rule of international customary law.210 Instead, they argued that 
well-established rules of international law required postcolonial states to honour the 
concessions and fulfill the contract terms of concessions that had been agreed 
during colonial rule. Moreover, they objected to the proposition that domestic law 
would govern the concessions, arguing instead that they were governed by an 
international law of contracts and that the disputes should be settled by international 
arbitration. The position of capital-exporting states found support in numerous of 
arbitral awards that helped “internationalize” concession agreements, a 
development which is of fundamental importance to the understanding of the 
Nicaraguan canal agreement. Again, recurring conflicts over the protection of 
foreign investment would lead to  reassertions of the existing content of 
international investment law but also to the development of new principles for the 
protection of foreign investment.211 
 
4.4 The internationalization of Concessions 
The legal standing of concessions and their connection to international law caused a 
particular rift between the positions of developing and developed states. 
Developing nations contended that disputes over such agreements fell within their 
national jurisdiction and that international law did not apply, as concessions were 
contracts between a state and a private party. Instead, they argued, national law 
governed concessions and therefore the cancelation or modification of such 
concessions was a prerogative implicit in the notion of retaining permanent 
sovereignty. In response, developed nations, whose corporations were most often 
the concessionaries, insisted that sovereign states had to abide by their undertakings 
and recognize international law as governing concessions. Further, they argued that 
any upcoming disputes arising out of concessions should be determined by 
international arbitration, and that host states either had to perform their obligations 
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or pay monetary compensation equal to the full prospective value of the 
contracts.212 The intensity of the debate over the legal nature of concession 
agreements was indicative of the importance of its outcome. In an ordinary 
agreement between a state and a private entity, the state would maintain certain 
powers with respect to the agreement that it would be able to exercise in the interest 
of its people. However, if concession agreements with foreign investors were seen 
as similar to international treaties, states’ abilities to change the terms of the 
agreement would consequently be very restricted.213  
 
From the 1950s and onwards, a series of arbitral awards would adopt the reasoning 
of capital-exporting states and help to internationalize concession agreements.214 
The principles advanced by these awards had been thitherto unknown in 
international law.215 It had previously been uncontested that in usual circumstances, 
the laws of the host state would govern the agreements as they were made between 
the host state and a private entity and not between two sovereign states.216 As late 
as in the 1952 case between the United Kingdom and Iran, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), declared that an agreement between a state and a corporation could 
not be elevated to the international level.217 However, several arbitral awards 
departed from this established principle by holding that host state law was 
inadequate to address the complexities of modern commercial contracts.218 
Concession agreements were framed as unique agreements, so-called economic 
development agreements, and a new system of law that had international character 
but which was not public international law, were said to govern them. This new law 
of contracts emerged in these arbitral decisions and the law of home states that 
represented the ‘modern law of nature’ in effect selectively replaced the law of host 
states.219 
 
Arbitral decisions and scholarly writings of the time in their support influenced the 
nature of arbitral clauses in concession agreements. Whereas earlier such clauses 
rarely had made specific reference to international law as governing the 
agreements, concession agreements in the following decades often made reference 
to dispute resolution through arbitration that would apply “general principles of 
law”.220 This enabled the further internationalization of concession agreements. As 
the legal scholar Anthony Anghie writes, it was “a category which by now enabled 
the effortless transposition of Western concepts of law that provided for the 
comprehensive protection of property”.221 This movement was accompanied by a 
parallel development in the institutional architecture governing foreign investments. 
In 1965, efforts backed by capital-exporting states and headed by the World Bank, 
led to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
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nationals of Other States (ICSID convention).222 ICSID was created to administer 
international investment arbitrations, the first institution specifically given this task, 
and was presented as a “depoliticization” of investment disputes.223Nevertheless, 
this development supported the positions of capital-exporting states and helped 
frame their position as legal rather than political.224 
 
In 1977, the Texaco decision further internationalized concession agreements by 
elaborating on the principles established by previous arbitral awards. The case 
concerned a concession contract granted to the Texaco Corporation by Libya and 
was delivered when the NIEO movement was at its peak. The decision would 
become a keystone in the construction of the modern international law on foreign 
investment.225 In the decision, the arbitrator concluded that a reference to 
‘international arbitration’ implied both that the dispute had to be resolved through 
international arbitration and that the law applied was the new international law of 
contracts. Moreover, the mere fact that the contract was an “economic development 
agreement” elevated it to the level of international law, even if explicit reference 
was made to national law as the governing law. The arbitrator held that concessions 
between foreign corporations and developing states were designed specifically to 
prevent states from exercising their usual sovereign powers. In particular, the 
investor had to be protected against the risks of the law of the host country being 
modified and against government measures that would terminate the contract.226  
 
The characterization of concession agreements as similar to “quasi treaties” by 
capital-exporting states and legal scholars further advanced the argument that 
concession agreements had been internationalized. Concessions were argued to 
exist between two international entities, the developing state and the corporation, 
which were seen as having a quasi-sovereign status that enabled it to take action 
against the state on an international plane. The significance of this argument was 
that it considerably limited states’ abilities to change the terms of concession 
agreements, as the ability of a state to unilaterally amend the obligations in a treaty 
was limited by the principle of pacta sunt servanda in international law. Thus, the 
characterization of concessions as quasi-treaties had the effect of restricting the 
regulatory ability of developing states.227  
 
To conclude, the NIEO movement and its period of confrontation led to insecurity 
about the customary international rules governing foreign investment228, yet 
ultimately failed in its attempt to reorient international investment law.229 Yet 
again, capital-exporting states’ responses led to reassertions of the existing content 
of international investment law but also to the development of new principles on 
the protection of foreign investment. Legal doctrine and the arbitral awards 
reinforced the assertions made by capital-exporting states that served to limit host 
states’ power to unilaterally amend their obligations under agreements with foreign 
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investors.230 As concessions between states and governments were made into 
internationalized contracts, host states could not rely on any residual power to 
amend the terms of the contract, whatever the demands of public welfare. As a 
consequence, developing states were deprived of a hugely important source of 
bargaining power, their sovereignty. This inevitably shifted the relative strength of 
the two parties in a significant manner and had implications for the content of 
investment agreements. The application of contract principles in situations where 
developing states were deprived of their sovereignty as a source of bargaining 
power considerably shifted the relative strengths between them and foreign 
investors.231  
 
The internationalization of concessions added a new legal layer to such agreements. 
Previously in history, concession agreements had served to insert legal concepts for 
the protection of foreign property in many developing nations, yet the enforcement 
of these rules had been dependent on the actions of investors’ home states. Now, 
enforcement was made possible through the legal sphere. The connection of 
agreements between host state and foreign investors to international law and 
international arbitration sought to remove the agreements from the national sphere 
and the power of host states. This development was no coincidence, but rather a 
continuum of the fundamental conflicts over the protection of foreign property and 
the creation of principles in international investment law centered on the protection 
of foreign investors. 
 
The internationalization of concessions also shifted the relative bargaining powers 
between host states and investors. A legal climate balanced in the favor of the 
investor evolved that exacerbated the already relatively weak bargaining position of 
developing states. This continuous process paved the way for the inequities found 
in the Nicaraguan canal agreement. It enabled a focus on investor rights and not 
responsibilities to the detriment of host state interests, and the view of host states’ 
regulation as political risk that had to be mitigated could find clearer expression. 
Examining this legal development, it appears logical that the environmental and 
social effects of the foreign investment are not given due consideration under the 
Nicaraguan canal agreement. Consistently, rules on foreign investment had been 
focused on the protection of such investments. Competing interests of host states 
were treated as risks to such investments and could be regulated that way in the 
evolving legal climate.   
 
If concession agreements had remained purely under the sphere of national law, the 
Nicaraguan canal agreement would most likely have looked very different. Instead, 
the treatment of concession agreements and their connection to international 
investment law would to continue to evolve. For the challenges by capital-
importing states during the 1970s resulted in additional responses from capital-
exporting states. This led to a further judicialization of the protection of foreign 
investment. The increasing use of economic stabilization clauses and the spread of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) provide the final pieces to this chapter’s 
explanation to the content of the Nicaraguan canal agreement.  
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4.5 Into the 21st Century: Responses Through 
Regime Creation and Stabilization Clauses 
4.5.1 Responses Through Regime Creation 
Following World War II, several attempts at creating a multi-lateral framework for 
international investment protection had been made by capital-exporting states and 
investor organizations. However, largely due to the resistance of capital-importing 
states to the proposed level of investment protection, no binding agreement was 
reached.232 Instead, many capital-exporting states shifted focus and started to 
engage in one-on-one negotiations with developing states to conclude bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs).233 The first BIT was concluded already in 1959, yet 
between 1959 and 1989 only 386 such agreements were concluded despite 
increased efforts.234 However, a remarkable surge in the number of BITs concluded 
occurred in the beginning of the 1990s and continued up until 2008. In terms of 
content, the agreements generally resembled previous draft conventions for multi-
lateral treaties and focused on protecting investors of developed countries investing 
in developing countries.235 In parallel, ICSID had become the main forum for the 
settlement of international investment disputes and was increasingly interwoven 
into the framework of international investment agreements.236 Through 
international arbitration, investor protection standards in BITs developed. The 
interpretation of foreign investment protection standards in international tribunals, 
notably the standard of fair and equitable treatment, the focus on legitimate 
expectations of the investor and requirements to maintain a stable legal framework, 
have expanded the investor protection under such treaties.237  
 
Some scholars argue the vast expansion of BITs and the references to international 
arbitration prove that previous conflicts over the content of international investment 
law have been overcome.238 Rather, it appears as if a number of factors coincided to 
cause developing nations to enter into BITs and effectively assume obligations to 
which they had previously vigorously objected. First, the 1980s saw a strong 
political movement towards economic liberalization. Institutions such as IMF and 
the World Bank continued efforts towards opening markets in developing countries 
to trade and investment, promoting a set of economic policy prescriptions known as 
the “Washington Consensus”.239 Second, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 
caused a significant geopolitical shift and left further room for policies aimed at 
economic liberalization. In addition, China had adopted its “Open Door” policy 
with the explicit aim of attracting foreign investments.240 These trends coincided 
with declining credit and foreign aid flows to developing states, which contributed 
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to increasing levels of debt in developing states. In this environment, developing 
states were left with few options to raise capital and as a result the competition for 
foreign investment increased.241 Participation in BITs became seen as a “must” to 
attract foreign investment, despite the fact that evidence on the impact of such 
treaties on FDI flows is ambiguous.242 Even though collectively developing states 
might have been better served by rejecting high protection of foreign investments, 
individual conclusions of BITs resulted in pressure on other developing states to 
agree to similarly high levels of investor protection.243  
 
In recent years the number of BITs concluded has slowed down, yet the number has 
still been increasing. As of today, 2929 active BITs form part of the international 
investment agreement network, and have arguably become the model agreement to 
regulate foreign investments.244 Meanwhile, investor protection standards of BITs 
have been interpreted expansively in international tribunals. Paradoxically, it 
appears as if individual conclusions of BITs have resulted in a framework for the 
protection of foreign investment that capital-exporting states have been seeking and 
that capital-importing states have been resisting throughout history.245 However, 
this should not been interpreted as a global consensus over the content of 
international investment law and the rules on international investment protection. In 
fact, BITs have received increasing criticism during recent years for being heavily 
tilted in investors’ favor.246 The number of tribunal cases has increased significantly 
during recent years to 608 known cases in 2014, and discontent has been growing 
among states with the existing international investment agreement regime and its 
impact on regulatory powers to pursue policies in the public interest. As a result, 
several countries have sought to revise their model agreements renegotiating their 
existing BITs. A smaller group of countries have announced their suspension of 
future investment agreement negotiations, while some have started to terminate 
their existing international investment agreements.247 
 
The impact of the large number of BITs on the evolution of customary international 
law on the protection of foreign investment remain unclear and this linkage 
between treaty law and customary law has been subject to much academic 
debate.248 Yet growing criticism from developing states of the level of investment 
protection under the BIT regime illustrate that the fundamental tensions between 
capital-importing states and capital-exporting states remain in international 
investment law. The parallel evolution in the use of stabilization clauses in 
investment agreements related to those of the Nicaraguan canal agreement has 
followed similar patterns.  
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4.5.2 Stabilization Clauses and the Nicaraguan Canal 
Agreement 
Beginning in the 1970s, stabilization clauses249 became an increasingly important 
feature of long-term investment agreements. They served as an additional response 
to the challenges by capital-importing states during the NIEO movement directed at 
wider issues of economic injustice. Under traditional stabilization clauses, it was 
taken that states consented to suspend their usual public legislative and regulatory 
powers with respect to the contract once they had entered into it. That no unilateral 
amendment of the agreement could take place once the agreement was signed 
served to further ensure that host states would abstain from cancelling or modify 
agreements with foreign investors.250 The binding effect of such clauses under 
international law was supported by the argument that a state could exercise 
sovereignty by binding itself to a particular arrangement. However, this position 
radically differed from similar agreements standing in capital-exporting states, 
where government contracts were susceptible to unilateral amendment.251  
 
Doctrinal opinion remained sharply divided over the issue of the international legal 
effect and validity of stabilization clauses. One school of thought expressed the 
view that such clauses rendered the principle of pacta sunt servanda applicable to 
the investment agreements. Thus, any breach of contract by a host state was 
considered an unlawful act under international law. A second school of thought 
maintained that permanent sovereignty over national resources constituted jus 
cogens, which a state cannot waive, and thereby questioned the validity of 
stabilization clauses. Following this argument, sovereignty would thus constitute a 
lawful ground for termination of agreements without compensation.252 In addition, 
opponents of stabilization clauses argued that while the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda might apply to private contracts, it had no application to state contracts 
that traditionally are regarded as defeasible in the public interest.253 This debate 
illustrates the continuous conflict over the rules on foreign investment.  
 
The exact legal significance and effect of traditional stabilization clauses has never 
been fully clarified, which is illustrated by the divergence in jurisprudence.254 
Based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda, some arbitral awards found that such 
clauses prohibited otherwise lawful nationalizations. Notably, this view formed part 
of the internationalization of concessions and was for example advocated for by the 
arbitral tribunal in the Texaco decision.255 However, other arbitral awards discarded 
this line of reasoning. In Aminoil v Kuwait, the tribunal concluded that a typical 
stabilization clause should not be presumed to imply that a state lost the right to 
expropriate a contract valid for 60 years. Yet the binding effect of stabilization 
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clauses was upheld. The tribunal found that the value in such a provision was that it 
reinforced the necessity for full compensation in the event of any expropriation 
from the host state.256 This view was supported by later cases brought to 
international arbitration.257  
 
The lack of homogenous jurisprudence and the uncertainty associated with the legal 
effects of traditional stabilization clauses in event of their breach, contributed to 
their decreasing use in practice together with additional factors.258 Many foreign 
investors began to acknowledge that stabilization clauses which completely froze 
the legal order of the host state for purposes of the contract, did not necessarily 
safeguard their interests. Particularly in situations where host states adopted 
legislation that would otherwise benefit the investor, such stabilization clauses 
instead protected the interests of the host state.259 Moreover, beginning in the 1990s 
the enactment of new environmental regulations became seen as a growing political 
and financial risk to foreign investors. In 1996, the legal scholars Wälde & Ndi 
wrote: “Perhaps most relevant at the moment is the imposition of new 
environmental obligations by subsequent regulation or by an administrative/judicial 
ruling reinterpreting existing law on which the investment decision may to some 
extent have been based”.260 These factors all contributed to the increasing use of 
economic stabilization clauses similar to those of the Nicaraguan agreement, which 
focused on the indemnification of investors in the event of legislative action.  
 
The use of economic stabilization clauses has become increasingly popular in the 
21st century. Their supporters praise them as a compromise between state’s exercise 
of legislative and regulatory power and the viability of contractual relationships. 
They also point out that such clauses do not necessarily exclude the possibility of 
new regulations that change the law applicable to the contract, but simply intends to 
remedy the negative impact of such regulations and are used to avoid uncertainty 
regarding the consequences of a breach of a stabilization clause. Nevertheless, 
some supporters of such clauses also acknowledge that the presence of stabilization 
clauses may have a deterrent effect on the state exercising its legislative power.261  
 
The flexibility of economic stabilization clauses is used to explain their increasing 
popularity among developing countries. A United Nation’s report on stabilization 
clauses and human rights (Shemberg and Aizawa report) observed that host states 
in the developing world use such clauses as a way to assure investors of a favorable 
investment climate. The use of these stabilization clauses has been described as part 
of the current “favorable investment climate”.262 However, the use of economic 
stabilization clauses has received ample critique from human rights advocates. 
They argue that the requirement of a host state to compensate the investor for 
compliance with new regulations is wrong in principle, as it denies the state its 
proper role as legislator with powers different and greater than corporations. 
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Further, they point to the chilling or hindering effect of stabilization clauses on the 
application of social and environmental standards. Furthermore, they claim that 
such effects are particularly grave in developing countries where rapid legislative 
development and implementation is needed.263 Similar concerns have been echoed 
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who have pointed to 
the risk of investment liberalization in favor of investors’ rights to the detriment of 
rights and interests of other actors.264 
 
Such concerns have found empirical support. In 2009, the Shemberg and Aizawa 
report found that stabilization clauses in developing countries were likely to limit 
the application of new social and environmental laws to the investment. These 
clauses stood in stark contrast to the use of stabilization clauses in developed 
countries, where new laws of general application were instead usually at the risk of 
the investor. In fact, investors in developed countries were usually only shielded 
from new laws if those were clearly discriminatory. The report’s general 
proposition for the reasons of this disparity was that the practice of more extensive 
stabilization clauses in developing countries correlated with perceptions of 
investment risk. However, according to the report this did not sufficiently explain to 
the disparity in practice between developed and developing host states.265  
 
The precise impact of economic stabilization clauses remains unclear. As of a few 
years ago, there were no reported cases where such clauses had been enforced in 
private or international arbitration. Yet, as the Shemberg and Aizawa report 
concluded: “…it should be assumed that investors include such clauses in 
investment contracts with the expectation that they may rely on them when faced 
with adverse changes in the law, and they expect them to be enforced”.266 
Accordingly, the report concluded that stabilization in modern contracts that did not 
allow exemptions might negatively impact the host state’s ability to implement new 
social and environmental regulation.267  
 
4.6 Summary 
The increasing use of economic stabilization clauses, the spread of BITs and the 
growing role of international arbitration bring the historical legal development into 
the present. As the effect of traditional stabilization clauses have become less 
certain, increasing emphasis have been put on the indemnification of foreign 
investors in the event of host state regulation. In a similar way, the spread of BITs 
have served to fill the gap after failed attempts at multi-lateral frameworks for the 
protection of foreign investment. As presented, these agreements have often 
resulted in a level of investment protection that many host states have resisted 
throughout history. It is in this legal environment that the Nicaraguan canal 
agreement has been made.  
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The spread of BITs and the use of economic stabilization clauses can be seen as a 
continuum of previous efforts to secure the protection of foreign investments. 
While the character of these efforts has changed over time, the focus on protecting 
the interests of capital-exporting states has remained the same. In light of this 
development of international investment law, the critique of economic stabilization 
clauses and the BIT regime for their potentially chilling effect on the regulatory 
powers of host states come as no surprise.  
 
The fact that economic stabilization clauses are predominantly used in developing 
countries highlights how international investment law aggravates existing 
asymmetries of power. To an extent, economic stabilization clauses can be viewed 
as legal tools to insure the foreign investor against economic risks. However, the 
same clauses often appear to reduce the bargaining power of host states. 
Particularly for smaller developing states, which are already in a relatively weak 
bargaining position vis-à-vis foreign corporations, this legal practice appear to 
provide fertile ground for agreements that are incredibly generous to the investor. It 
is no surprise that agreements of similar character are hard to find in developed 
countries.  
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5 Conclusion  
Approaching international law as having emerged through a process of repetitive 
assertions of power and responses to power, this thesis has highlighted a recurring 
pattern of conflict that has shaped the current investment law regime. This 
methodological approach has been informed by a considerable body of legal 
scholarship, which has critically examined the history of international law and its 
connection to socio-political imbalances of power.  
 
In answer to the thesis’ first research question, it is concluded that the Nicaraguan 
canal agreement is heavily tilted in favor of the foreign investor and might have 
significant effects on Nicaragua’s legislative and regulatory power. In answer to the 
second research question, which seeks to explain the findings in part one, it is 
concluded that historical legal developments have contributed to the imbalanced 
nature of the agreement. As the historical analysis shows, the tensions and 
controversies surrounding the Nicaraguan canal agreement are fundamentally not 
new. Rather, the agreement’s content and existence manifest the conflicts of 
interests that have dominated the development of international investment law since 
its emergence in the 19th century. The outcome of these contests has found 
expression in the law and in agreements, mostly legitimizing the position of capital-
exporting states.  
 
From the very beginning, international investment law evolved as rules on the 
protection of foreign investment, to facilitate the European commercial and 
political expansion. Concession agreements specifically were used as legal tools to 
insert European standards of property protection into host states’ legal 
environments. During these processes, little to no emphasis was placed on the 
interests of host states.  
 
Since the 19th century, host states have challenged the rules made by capital-
exporting states and investors. Disputes were not necessarily about the desirability 
of foreign investment. In fact, many 19th century leaders of developing states 
viewed concessions as essential mechanisms for boosting the economy. Yet they 
persistently resisted the legal protection of these concessions and their enforcement 
by capital-exporting states. As many challenges resulted in violent disputes that 
often related to the expropriation of foreign investments, arguments were advanced 
in the shape of the international minimum standard and the Calvo doctrine, which 
encapsulated the fundamental and persistent disagreements between the parties.  
 
The Nicaragua canal concession shows both similarities and differences to the 19th 
century use of concessions by developing countries. By promoting the canal 
concession as a way to lift Nicaragua out of poverty and modernize the economy, 
president Daniel Ortega has used arguments similar to those put forward by his 
historic predecessors. However, while host states in the 19th century vigorously 
objected to the levels of investment protection enforced by home states, the 
Nicaraguan government has not objected to any of the legal implications of the 
concession. Instead, the canal agreement appears to have removed these historical 
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conflicts. Nevertheless, the intense criticism surrounding the Nicaraguan canal 
project show how fundamental conflicts of interests remain.  
 
Intermediate processes in the 20th and 21st century can explain the apparent paradox 
between the content of the agreement and the conflicting Nicaraguan interests at 
stake. For much of the 20th century, challenges by host states to the protection of 
foreign investments resulted in additional expropriations and fierce debate over the 
rules governing foreign investments. Certainly, home states’ interests in preventing 
arbitrary expropriations of foreign property were to some extent legitimate. 
However, the historical examination show how responses by capital-exporting 
states not only reinforced current legal principles, but also further tilted them in 
favor of the investor. The establishment of the Hull formula during the first half of 
the 20th century serves to illustrate this point. In response to widespread land 
reforms, capital-exporting states not only reasserted the content of international 
investment law for the protection of foreign property, but also explicitly discarded 
any other needs of host states as irrelevant to international law. Subsequent 
developments would further reduce the powers of developing states.    
 
During the second half of the 20th century, the specific legal standing of investment 
agreements came at the center of these conflicts. Through the internationalization of 
investment contracts, tribunals changed legal doctrine and supported capital-
exporting states’ attempts to lift investment agreements out of national legal orders 
of host states. The portrayal of host states’ law as inadequate to address the 
complexities of modern commercial contracts were particularly directed at 
protecting foreign corporations in developing states. Moreover, the establishment of 
ICSID268 served to institutionalize and depoliticize the issue of enforcement of 
foreign property protection. This development weakened the bargaining positions 
of new and developing states, the very states that needed the flexibility necessary to 
achieve development.  
 
As the historical chapter of this thesis has shown, substantial challenges by host 
states under the NIEO movement in the 1970s and 1980s led to uncertainty about 
the theory of internationalization of contracts. Yet additional responses from 
capital-exporting states in the shape of BITs, references to international arbitration 
and the increasing use of economic stabilization clauses served to further protect 
foreign investments. The significant shift in international investment law that 
followed was facilitated by an era of increased economic liberalization that 
coincided with a number of other factors. Increasingly, foreign investments were 
secured protection under treaties and investment agreements, a protection further 
expanded by international arbitration. These developments resulted in the legal 
climate in which the Nicaraguan canal agreement was negotiated.  
 
The increasing use of economic stabilization clauses has been hailed as a successful 
compromise between host states and foreign investors. Undeniably, host states 
stand to gain from reassurances to foreign investors and have used concession 
agreements historically for the same reasons. However, the insertion of economic 
stabilization clauses is but a tiny step towards acknowledging the interests of host 
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states, after countless steps in favor of foreign investors. The connection between 
investment agreements and international legal rules and arbitration was never self-
evident. Neither was the notion that host states’ exercise of action in the public 
interest is conditioned upon the complete satisfaction of foreign investors. 
Arguably, economic stabilization clauses only represent a slight turn towards the 
consideration of host states’ interests.  
 
The Nicaraguan canal agreement demonstrates the effect of this legal development 
for a specific investment agreement in a small developing country. It amplifies 
existing asymmetries of power between Nicaragua and HKND, undermining the 
state’s already relatively weak bargaining position both in the making of the 
agreement and during the life of the project. The legal development thereby helps 
explain the scope of investor rights under the concession agreement: the blanket tax 
exemptions, the slow transfer of ownership to the Nicaraguan state and the 
investor’s exclusive rights under an extensive concession period.  
 
By examining the canal agreement and the intensive debate that surround it, this 
thesis illustrates some of the practical implications of this legal development for 
stakeholders other than the foreign investor. The potential effects of the Nicaraguan 
canal project are enormous. Up to 120,000 Nicaraguans may be uprooted as a direct 
effect of the project and about 30,000 people may have their property expropriated. 
Indigenous groups’ right to their communal land, which are protected under the 
constitution after a century-long political struggle, are disregarded by the 
agreement. Furthermore, the environmental effects could be catastrophic. The 
dredging of Lake Cocibolca, on which more than 200,000 people rely for their 
drinking water, has alarmed environmental scientists. The project’s impact on 
wildlife and ecosystems is similarly a subject of great concern to the scientific 
community.  
 
The environmental and social impact of the Nicaraguan canal project illustrates a 
fundamental conflict of interest for the state itself. The magnitude of the project 
might require substantial regulation by the Nicaraguan state to protect its interests. 
Even so, HKND is protected against any of the economic effects of such regulatory 
action. Accordingly, it appears as if Nicaragua will have to bear any costs that 
result from such legislation during the life of the project. Not only could this result 
in significant costs for an already poor nation, but it might also impact Nicaragua’s 
ability to implement new social and environmental regulations in the first place. 
Clearly, there is an underlying tension between the two ideas that Nicaragua should 
honour its contractual commitment to HKND and that it ultimately should act in the 
public interest. Because of the current legal climate and the connection of 
concession agreements to the sphere of international law, this tension has currently 
resulted in an overwhelming focus on Nicaragua’s contractual commitment. 
Although the agreement operates in a social and environmental context, it does not 
appear to engage with issues of environmental sustainability or social 
considerations of Nicaragua. Had concession agreements remained in the sphere of 
national law, the Nicaraguan canal agreement would most likely have looked very 
different.  
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It is easy to discard historic conflicts as a thing of the past and separate them from 
legal doctrines in the present. The spread of BITs and similar investment 
agreements could be taken at face value as a proof of international consensus over 
the rules of international investment protection. Yet, recent criticism of the BIT 
regime and terminations of investment agreements hint at the fundamental conflicts 
inherent to this legal regime. Such indications underscore that historical conflicts 
cannot simply be regarded as long since overcome. These conflicts have provided 
the foundation for the legal environment in which the Nicaraguan canal agreement 
was made and will continue to shape the rules governing foreign investments.  
 
Thus, simply explaining the content of the Nicaraguan canal agreement as a result 
of the bargaining between two parties would be a fundamental mistake. This is not 
to say that Nicaragua has been forced to enter into the agreement under the current 
circumstances. Yet, as this thesis has shown, these circumstances have been shaped 
by a historical development. Perhaps, the construction of a transoceanic canal 
through Nicaragua will finally lift the country out of poverty. Yet, for many 
decades to come, Nicaragua risks being caught between its commitments to HKND 
and its undertakings to its citizens. Only time will tell what effects this will have for 
Nicaragua and its people. 
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Supplement A  
 
 
 
Proposed route for the Nicaragua Canal  
 
Image source: http://geographical.co.uk/places/wetlands/item/526-nicaragua-canal-
construction-begins, last visited 2016-01-06 
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